The Irony of Florida: The System Worked CASS R. SUNSTEIN

THE NEW REPUBLIC

Palestine Then and Now
Anita Shapira

Israel's Unnecessary Election
Yossi Klein Halevi

ECEMBER 11, 2000



HOW THE **RECOUNT** DROVE THE GOP **INSANE**

ONATHAN CHAIT
YAN LIZZA
ARTIN PERETZ
HE EDITORS

#BXBKDML**********5-DIGIT 94301
#TNR0000068171/5#12 09DEC02 P7 B1187
19186

RON K UNZ
555 BRYANT ST # 371
PALO ALTO CA 94301-1704

.50US $

787446 8

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ardie has a hot lunch date.
Thanks to the Philip Morris Companies, Ardie Collingsworth can receive a hot meal, and a visitor, almost every day. That's because Philip Morris provides grants to eliminate waiting lists for Meals on Wheels programs across the country. These grants help people like Ardie, and thousands of additional seniors who might otherwise go hungry, have a regular lunch date. In fact, over the past decade, the Philip Morris Companies have given over $350 million in food and donations to help feed the hungry. To learn more on our efforts to fight hunger, visit philipmorris.com.
Working to make a difference.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP MORRIS COMPANIES
KRAFT
PHILIP MORRIS U.S.A.
Miller
©2000 Philip Morris Companies Inc.
LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Dione Martin dreamed for years of owning a home.

But she never dreamed for a second she could move in so soon.

The mortgage application and approval process used to be a long, drawn-out affair. But with Fannie Mae's Desktop Underwriter,® the mortgage industry's leading automated underwriting system, more Americans are able to live the dream of homeownership faster than ever before.

Last year alone, our lender partners used our cutting-edge technology for nearly 2.5 million loans. When they use this system, they can serve more borrowers and qualify more families — and prospective home buyers can get a loan decision in minutes instead of weeks. Plus their origination costs are lower because Desktop Underwriter saves money, too. And to help our lender partners work with families who may not yet qualify for a mortgage, the system now even gives detailed information on what areas need improvement in order for a borrower to obtain a mortgage.

At Fannie Mae, we'll continue to look for ways to put technology to work to help our lender partners expand homeownership by making it easier, faster, and more affordable for more people, like Dione Martin, to live the American Dream.

FannieMae

www.fanniemae.com

©2000, Fannie Mae. All rights reserved. The house logo is a registered mark of Fannie Mae.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Journal of Politics and the Arts

WASHINGTON, D.C.
DECEMBER 11, 2000
ISSUE 4,482

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF AND CHAIRMAN
MARTIN PERETZ

EDITOR
PETER BEINART
Literary Editor
LEON WIESELTIER
Executive Editor
CHRISTOPHER ORR
Senior Editors
JONATHAN CHAIT, JONATHAN COHN, MICHELLE COTTLE, GREGG EASTERBROOK, DAVID GRANN, JOHN B. JUDIS, LAWRENCE F. KAPLAN, ANDREW SULLIVAN, JAMES WOOD
Legal Affairs
JEFFREY ROSEN
Assistant Managing Editor
RUTH FRANKLIN
Films: STANLEY KAUFFMANN
Theater: ROBERT BRUSTEIN
Poetry: CHARLES WRIGHT
Art: JED PERL
Architecture: MARTIN FILLER
Dance: MINDY ALOFF
The New Republic Online
MARTIN EDLUND, ARI GERSEN, BRIAN GROH, DANIEL HALPERN, JEREMY MCCARTER
New Republic Books (BASIC BOOKS)
JOHN DONATICH
Contributing Editors
FOUAD AJAMI, AKHIL REED AMAR, PETER BERKOWITZ, ELIOT A. COHEN, JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, NATHAN GLAZER, ANTHONY GRAFTON, YOSSI KLEIN HALEVI, ANN HULBERT, TONY JUDT, ROBERT KAGAN, MICKEY KAUS, MICHAEL KINSLEY, CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER, GLENN C. LOURY, MATTHEW MILLER, SHERWIN B. NULAND, DAVID RIEFF, MICHAEL J. SANDEL, MAGGIE SCARF, LEE SIEGEL, RONALD STEEL, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARGARET TALBOT, E.V. THAW, MICHAEL WALZER, SEAN WILENTZ, ALAN WOLFE, ROBERT WRIGHT
Contributing Artists
JACK COUGHLIN, VINT LAWRENCE, DAVID SCHORR
Special Correspondent
ANNA HUSARSKA
Associate Editors
MICHAEL CROWLEY, FRANKLIN FOER, RYAN LIZZA, JASON ZENGERLE
Consulting Art Director
JONATHAN HOUSTON
Editorial-Corporate Coordinator
LAURA E. OBOLENSKY
Production and Information-Technology Director
BRUCE STEINKE
Production Manager
HENRY RIGGS
Assistant Editors
KATIE ISENBERG, BENJAMIN SOSKIS, SARAH WILDMAN
Assistant to the Editor
ELI KINTISCH
Assistant Literary Editor
LAURA BEERS
Assistant Poetry Editor
MELANIE REHAK
Reporter-Researchers
BRYAN CURTIS, NOAM SCHEIBER, MARCIA YABLON

President
ANDREW MCCOLOUGH
Associate Publisher
CHRISTINA R. BONIFER
Circulation and Marketing Director
SHANE G. BOEL
Director of Advertising, West
JOAN STAPLETON TOOLEY
Director of Advertising, Washington
NICHOLAS COSTON
Director of Advertising, New York
ELLEN JARVIS
Book Publishing Director
MELISSA LORD
Marketing Manager
SHABNAM K. SHARMA
Circulation Manager
HOPE ROBERTS
Office Manager/Accounting Assistant
SHAWNA ROGERS
Assistant Manager of Circulation
KELLY SPRING
Advertising Coordinator
ANN ROSSAKI
Accounting Assistant
VANESSA WILSON
Back Issues and Reception
MONICA BROWN

6 **CORRESPONDENCE** Refighting the cold war, refighting the Revolutionary War, &c.

8 **ANDREW SULLIVAN** TRB: GOSPEL OF CHAD Lessons from a seventh-century saint.

9 **THE EDITORS** PARTISAN REVIEW The GOP's strange assault on judicial review.

10 **NOTEBOOK** The worst Florida recount metaphors, &c.

12 **FRANKLIN FOER** MOURNING AFTER The Naderites rally behind Al Gore. Too late.

13 **JOSHUA HAMMER AND ZORAN CIRJAKOVIC** BELGRADE DISPATCH: BALKAN GHOST Slobodan Milosevic's long, pathetic goodbye.

14 **YOSSI KLEIN HALEVI** JERUSALEM DISPATCH: LONG DIVISION A useless election.

15 **CASS R. SUNSTEIN** ONE FINE MESS Why Bush, Gore, and Florida law aren't to blame.

16 **JEFFREY ROSEN** JUDGE NOT The U.S. Supreme Court shouldn't have agreed to hear the Florida recount case. But it can still rescue its dignity.

18 **RYAN LIZZA** COUNTERPUNCH George W. Bush may not have Al Gore's legal firepower in Florida, but he has something even better: screamers.

20 **JONATHAN CHAIT** LOSING IT The Republicans may be winning the Florida recount struggle. But they are losing their sanity in the process.

24 **STANLEY KAUFFMANN** ON FILMS: PROFANE RITES *Bounce* lifts the spirits—formulaically.

25 **ROBERT BRUSTEIN** ON THEATER: DECONSTRUCTING SUSAN *Alice in Bed* is the ultimate postmodernist work; *Requiem for Srebrenica* is a worthy tract.

26 **ANITA SHAPIRA** EYELESS IN ZION *One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs Under the British Mandate* by Tom Segev

35 **ALBERT MURRAY** POEM *William Faulkner Noun, Place and Verb*

36 **DAVID BROOKS** MS. SMITH GOES TO WASHINGTON *Talk to Me: Listening Between the Lines* by Anna Deavere Smith

38 **ALAN WOLFE** SUBJECT MATTER MATTERS *Left Back: A Century of Failed School Reforms* by Diane Ravitch

42 **MARTIN PERETZ** LONDON DIARIST: DETACHED

On the Cover : Illustration by BILL RUSSELL
On the Web : www.thenewrepublic.com

THE NEW REPUBLIC, Vol. 223, Number 24, Issue 4,482, December 11, 2000. (Printed in the United States on November 29, 2000.) Published weekly (except for combined issues dated January 3, April 17 & 24, July 10 & 17, and August 28 & September 4, 2000) at 1220 19th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036. Telephone (202) 331-7494. For advertising inquiries, please contact Ann Rossaki at (202) 331-7494 or Ellen Jarvis in our NY sales office at (212) 924-8700. Yearly subscriptions, $59.94; foreign, $99.94 (U.S. funds); Canada, $79.94 (U.S. funds). Back issues, $4.00 (includes postage & handling). **© 2000 by The New Republic, Inc.****(ISSN 0028-6583). Periodicals postage paid at Washington, D.C., and additional mailing offices. Rights and permissions: fax (202) 331-0275. Indexed in Readers' Guide, Media Review Digest. Microform, Canadian Periodical Index, CD-ROM, issue, and article copies are available through University Microfilms Intnl., 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106. Telephone 1-800-521-0600. Postmaster: Send changes of address to The New Republic, P.O. Box 37298, Boone, IA 50037-0298. Member, Audit Bureau of Circulations. Unsolicited manuscripts can be returned only if accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped envelope (e-mail address: tnr@aol.com). For subscription inquiries or problems call 1-800-827-1289 or visit our website at www.tnr.com.**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cold war games

TO THE EDITORS:

In your November 6 Notebook you chastise *The New York Times* for allowing "a prominent writer [me] to play his tiresome and sickening games with history" in its pages. You even seem to dispute my right to argue that a "cadre of cold war historians" (whom, you point out, I have not named) has seized on "fragments from cold war archives, ambiguous intercepts from cables between Moscow and its American-based agents, and other ephemera" to make definitive pronouncements about matters that are "still in dispute." I'm curious as to whether THE NEW REPUBLIC indeed believes that I. F. Stone "in the end agreed to work for the NKVD"; that J. Robert Oppenheimer was "a conscious collaborator with the Soviet secret police"; and that Harry Hopkins, Franklin Delano Roosevelt's friend and adviser, was a "Soviet agent." These are among the conclusions of *The Venona Secrets*, a new book by Herbert Romerstein and the late Eric Breindel, to name but two of the unnamed cadre. Does TNR really contend that such claims are beyond dispute? And—oh, yes—I'm also curious to know how it's possible to be both "tiresome and sickening" at the same time.

VICTOR NAVASKY
Publisher and Editorial Director
The Nation
New York, New York

THE EDITORS REPLY:

Victor Navasky, indeed a prominent writer, only confirms his desire to continue playing "games with history." He ignores the consensus among historians that the Venona project files confirm the guilt of many accused in the 1950s of spying for the Soviet Union in the previous decade, including Alger Hiss, Julius Rosenberg, Lauchlin Currie, Duncan Lee, Harry Dexter White, Laurence Duggan, and others (see "Tangled Treason," by Sam Tanenhaus, July 5, 1999). The charges made by Herbert Romerstein (who made them on his own, without the assent of the late Eric Breindel), by contrast, are

The editors welcome correspondence from readers. Please address letters to Correspondence, TNR, 1220 19th Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20036 (letters may also be sent electronically to tnr@aol.com). All letters should include the writer's full name, address, and telephone number; be typed double-spaced; and be fewer than 200 words. Letters may be edited for space and clarity. Please do not send letters via fax.


Ralph Nader and the Stupidity of the Left
THE NEW REPUBLIC
WHY THE DEMOCRATS ARE FINISHED
WHY THEY'RE JUST GETTING STARTED

singular to him. They are not endorsed by careful and serious scholars who have studied the Venona files. Indeed, Romerstein is not a "cold war historian" at all; he is a former investigator for the House Un-American Activities Committee. His shabby work does not in any way invalidate the accurate revelations contained in Venona.

Ad hominem

TO THE EDITORS:

Peter Berkowitz has been extremely unfair ("Nutty Professors," November 27). Of the two advertisements that he ridicules, the second was not seen or approved by many of its so-called signatories, including Bruce Ackerman, Ronald Dworkin, and me. We would not have signed this advertisement if we had been informed of its content. Berkowitz mentions this fact in his article but buries it, since it does not support his ugly and preposterous suggestion that professors "tracked the Gore campaign's developing strategy."

The first advertisement went out of its way to praise George W. Bush for behaving "honorably," suggested no solution in particular, and had as its main goal the suggestion that issues remained in Florida and the presidential election had not yet been decided. At a time when all too many people were acting as if things were already over, it was entirely appropriate, perhaps even valuable, to make this suggestion quickly and publicly.

Berkowitz also offers an irrelevant, ad hominem attack on the role of professors in President Clinton's impeachment, when, he says, scholars did "what partisans do." This is wrong. No matter their political affiliation, the overwhelming majority of law professors believed, on principle, that Clinton's impeachment was unconstitutional. They would have expressed precisely the same view if the president had been named George Bush or Ronald Reagan. Many of us have defended presidential prerogatives, on constitutional and statutory grounds, in Republican administrations. We would be fully prepared to do the same in the future.

CASS R. SUNSTEIN
Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and Department of Political Science
University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois

Idle chatterers

TO THE EDITORS:

Jonathan Cohn very neatly summed up the TV coverage of this election cycle with his article on Sam Donaldson and Cokie Roberts's amusement at the name of the Dingell-Norwood bill ("Yuck, Yuck," November 6). Perhaps Americans—who no longer watch sports but merely catch the highlights shows to find out who won—haven't the patience to hear how a bill before Congress might affect their lives. Perhaps they truly don't care which candidate is for Dingell-Norwood and which has never bothered to learn what it means to rein in HMOs. But if Sunday-morning TV chatterers can't be bothered to learn about such matters and explain them, why on earth are they still on the air? Shows like Donaldson and Roberts's are supposed to be public-service television. What service are they doing when they insist that issues and policies and "the record" don't matter and that only polls and candidate "likability" do?

Donaldson has never been a deep thinker, but Roberts seems to get dumber by the hour. Bush may lack gravitas, but the people blithely ignoring his ignorance and matching it with their own are the real lightweights. I say, term limits for pundits!

ROGER MOORE
Winter Park, Florida

Roll reversal

TO THE EDITORS:

Lawrence F. Kaplan's article "Rollback" (October 30) contains references to me that are simply false. While it is true that in July 1990 I warned repeatedly that Saddam Hussein would invade and conquer Kuwait, it is incorrect that I ever "touted Iraq's military prowess in the run-up to the Gulf war," as Kaplan claims. In

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fact, during the buildup to Desert Storm, I cited Iraq's abysmal performance in the Iran-Iraq war as evidence that Iraq's Soviet equipment did not equate to even Soviet levels of military effectiveness. I would also note that my doctoral thesis was an 800-page treatment of the sources of Arab military ineffectiveness, and Iraq was one of the principal cases.

Kaplan also insinuates that I favor appeasing Iraq. Nothing could be further from the truth. In numerous classified and unclassified venues, I have written and stated that only an assertive and forceful approach is realistic when dealing with Saddam. Kaplan apparently overlooked my unclassified writings, including an article I co-authored in the British journal *Survival* in fall 1998, "Coercing Saddam: Lessons from the Past," which argued that the only way to compel Iraq to live up to its international obligations is with massive air strikes and support to the internal Iraqi opposition.

A cursory check of literature on Iraq policy might have avoided these mistakes.

KENNETH A. POLLACK
Washington, D.C.

LAWRENCE F. KAPLAN REPLIES:
Kenneth A. Pollack indeed "touted Iraq's military prowess in the run-up to the Gulf war"—so much so that on January 13, 1998, he gave an informal presentation to his colleagues at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy explaining his reasons for having done so. *The Washington Post*, too, reported Pollack's authorship of CIA estimates that "predicted fierce and effective Iraqi resistance" during Desert Storm. I'm pleased Pollack changed his mind about Iraqi military effectiveness when he wrote his doctoral thesis. What he neglects to mention is that he wrote his dissertation *after* the Gulf war. As for Pollack's 1998 article, I read it with great interest—mainly because he repudiated its substance a year later. In a 1999 *Foreign Affairs* article aptly titled "The Rollback Fantasy," Pollack dismissed the idea of using insurgents to roll back Iraqi forces as, well, fantasy. And to this day he continues to do exactly that.

Dis-establishment

TO THE EDITORS:
I was dismayed and saddened by your endorsement of Al Gore ("Al Gore for President," October 30), who represents much of what is wrong with our political establishment. His ability to change fundamental positions when convenient is legendary. His participation in the 1996 campaign finance fraud has been proved to everyone but Attorney General Janet Reno. His incredibly poor handling of America's relations with Russia is equally well-chronicled. His other venture into foreign policy, the Kyoto Treaty, was such an unmitigated disaster that his own party couldn't support it. Finally, his active support of the most corrupt president in U.S. history should have canceled any of his supposed strengths.

But I state the obvious. You are clearly in complete agreement, because your defense of Gore's endorsement is heavily weighted toward attacks on George W. Bush, not paeans for Gore.

JASON STEWART
Via the Internet

Radical write

TO THE EDITORS:
"Since Diggins is not really a historian," contends Gordon S. Wood in his review of my book *On Hallowed Ground* (October 30), "he does not have a historian's feel for the complexity, the nuances, the contexts, and the differentness of the past." What is behind Wood's desperate effort to read me out of the profession? Is it not the case of a reviewer reviewing a book that is about the reviewer himself, one who strains to deflect attention from himself by falsely claiming that my academic work has been preoccupied with taking on "the left"?

The truth is that absolutely nothing is said in the review about the 40 pages or so in *On Hallowed Ground* that subjects Wood's embarrassingly vulnerable book *The Radicalism of the American Revolution* to a thoroughgoing critique. For a historian who prides himself on precision, it is telling that Wood fails to understand that "radical republicanism" and a "radical democratic revolution" are contradictory notions, as I amply demonstrate. Wood may regard himself as a "historian," but he has written a book about a phenomenon that never happened in history. Neither the "Federalist" authors, Washington, Adams, Burke, Emerson, Tocqueville, Lincoln, Marx, nor any major thinker regarded the American Revolution as radical. Indeed, there is no example in all of modern history of a country with an established liberal environment leaving its identity behind in order to move forward to radicalism.

The concluding sentence of Wood's book declares: "The American Revolution created this democracy, and we are living with its consequences still." My book challenges Wood's dictum with the question, can a revolution create a democracy? Wood avoids the question by categorizing the questioner as not a historian. Instead of an honest debate, the reviewer beats a rhetorical retreat. I hardly expected Wood to change his mind about his book after reading my devastating critique. But not even to acknowledge it is deplorable coming from a reviewer who professes to know all the qualities essential for a legitimate historian.

JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS
New York, New York

GORDON S. WOOD REPLIES:
John Patrick Diggins's letter demonstrates only too well his prickly passion and his penchant for shooting from the hip. My statement that he is not really a historian was not an effort to read him out of the scholarly community, of which he is very much a vital part, and it was certainly not strained or desperate. It was rather an anything-but-angry conclusion based on Diggins's own view that "to study history is to study events in order to understand how similar conditions lead to similar effects." That, I contend, is not what modern historians do—a conclusion that Diggins doesn't even begin to confront. Instead he assumes that I must be angry with him because he subjected my book to a "devastating critique" and thus avoided debating him.

It's true that I did not mention my book specifically in the review, which I thought improper, but I did confront very directly and fully his view that the American Revolution could never be radical. Although I never explicitly mentioned my book, anyone familiar with it would know that I more than acknowledged Diggins's critique in my review; indeed, in four paragraphs (which are hardly "absolutely nothing") I defended the argument of my book against his criticism—a defense that he totally ignores in his letter. So much for "honest debate."

My review was not written in anger, but Diggins's letter certainly seems to have been. I think his fury about being considered something other than a historian is misplaced and has blinded him to what I actually said about him in my review. Diggins may not be a historian in my particular estimation, but, as I said in the review, he is surely a formidable cultural critic—in the same league as Louis Hartz and Christopher Lasch. This is not bad company. Unfortunately, however, this intemperate and mistaken letter suggests that Diggins's celebrated passion tends to overwhelm his ability to read texts accurately. ■

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TRB

FROM WASHINGTON

Gospel Of Chad

IF YOU'VE BEEN waiting to find some guiding metaphor or overarching analogy to lend clarity to our current electoral mess, you're finally in luck. Or, rather, your prayers have been answered. The heavenly respondent to our plight, I humbly submit, is a not entirely famous but now thoroughly relevant member of the holy choir. Yes, there's a Saint Chad. And he was quite explicit on the question of dimpled ballots.

OK, I made up that last bit, but I haven't made up Saint Chad himself or the relevance his story holds for our pregnant times. A reader alerted me to the saint's existence after looking up "chad" in the Encyclopedia Britannica. Chad, it turns out, lived in the wild and woolly half-Christianized England of the seventh century, and his life story is preserved in the laconic Latin of the Venerable Bede's *Ecclesiastical History of the English People*. Remarkably, the critical moment in Chad's ascent to sanctity was his response to a fiercely contested dispute over which of two equally qualified and consecrated candidates, Chad or Wilfrid, would assume the mighty title of bishop of York. In what seems to have been a mix-up of truly Palm Beach proportions, the two men were appointed simultaneously—one in England and one in France—for the same bishopric. And one of them had to take the high road and concede.

But I get ahead of myself. Chad came from an established family in the ecclesiastical power structure of pre-medieval England. One of his brothers, Cedd, had been bishop of the East Saxons. When Cedd died of the plague, Chad took over his monastery and, by all accounts, was a big monastic hit—so big, in fact, that in the year 664 King Oswiu of Northumbria sent Chad to Canterbury to be consecrated bishop of York. The only problem was that King Alhfrith, Oswiu's son, had other ideas. Alhfrith, in a custom quite common for the era, shared the kingship of Northumbria with his father; but, unlike his father and Chad, who were representatives of a semi-indigenous Celtic Christianity, Alhfrith was an ally of the more modern Roman wing of the English church. Alhfrith had had a Rome-educated tutor in things sacred, named Wilfrid. And, before Oswiu decided to tap Chad, Alhfrith had already sent Wilfrid to France to be consecrated bishop of York in a suitably grand and Roman ceremony. Two joint kings, in other words, appointed two rival bishops.

To make matters worse, there were some irregularities in Chad's appointment as bishop. When he showed up in Canterbury, on Oswiu's bidding, Chad found that the old archbishop had died, and there was no one there to consecrate him. So he schlepped back across the country (and I mean schlepped—Chad observed his order's rules of poverty and went everywhere on foot) to the kingdom of the West Saxons, where he was finally invested by Bishop Wine and two Celtic bishops of whom Rome did not entirely approve. And so, for a short time, the ancient Brits had two equally consecrated bishops of York. Even then, this dual consecration was highly unusual. The Oxford editors of my copy of Bede note:

> It is not easy to understand why Oswiu appointed Chad, apparently in Wilfrid's place; it may have been connected with his quarrel with his son, Alhfrith, who was Wilfrid's patron. It may be that [Chad] was appointed to assist rather than replace Wilfrid. But his consecration, carried out by Wine, a bishop who was later accused of simony, and two unorthodox British bishops, could certainly not have been considered satisfactory by the Roman party.

When Wilfrid arrived back in England, then, Chad was left hanging (sorry, couldn't resist). Wilfrid's investiture was far more official than Chad's, though both had perfectly good claims to be the rightful bishop of York. Alas, there was no archbishop of Canterbury to resolve the dispute until one Theodore was appointed in 668—some *four years* after the dual consecration. (And you thought four weeks was a long time to wait!) Theodore was a Romanist, and, once appointed, he soon set about putting the British church in order. According to Bede, Theodore

> made it clear to Bishop Chad that his consecration had not been regular, whereupon [Chad] humbly replied, "If you believe that my consecration was irregular, I gladly resign from the office; indeed I never believed myself to be worthy of it. But I consented to receive it, however unworthy, in obedience to the commands I received." When Theodore heard his humble reply, he said that he ought not to give up his office; but he completed his consecration a second time after the Catholic manner.

Despite Theodore's generous gesture of recertification, Chad insisted on letting Wilfrid take his place and retired to his monastery. Wilfrid—I don't know whether anyone ever called him "W."—was therefore triumphant. He "was administering the see of the church of York and of all the Northumbrians and Picts, as far as Oswiu's power extended." But the story wasn't over yet. When a new vacancy emerged a short time afterward—the bishopric of Mercia—Theodore, still impressed with Chad's grace and statesmanship after the York mess, gave the post to Chad, and, according to Bede, he served "in great holiness of life." You can still visit the site of Chad's episcopal seat in Lichfield in the Midlands. His humility extended to refusing even to make the long journey to be consecrated on horseback. Theodore had to physically lift Chad up, Bede says, and put him on a horse, "since he knew him to be a man of great sanctity."

Chad's tenure as bishop of Mercia was a highly successful one, though it lasted only two and a half years before the plague claimed him as well. According to Bede, Chad was buried in "a wooden coffin in the shape of a little house, having an aperture in its side, through which those who visit it out of devotion can insert their hands and take out a little of the dust." The dust, mixed with water, was said to cure the sick.

We also know what happened to Wilfrid. Under a subsequent storm of scandal, he was ejected from his bishopric by political and religious rivals, exiled, lost at sea, and shipwrecked among what Bede calls barbarians. Wilfrid only clawed his way back to his bishopric many years later, with the pope's help. He died soon after his restoration, and his epitaph included the phrase "Long time in tempests tossed."

As for Chad, history has treated him far more kindly. He made his saintly reputation not by seizing office but by relinquishing it gladly when asked. He is still revered in the English Midlands and is known colloquially, according to my old English history professor at Oxford, as the patron saint of lost causes. If I were Al Gore, I'd be on my knees praying to him right now. And I'd maybe even listen to his advice.

ANDREW SULLIVAN

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Partisan Review

MORE THAN THREE weeks into the post-campaign campaign, this much is clear: The next president will be chosen either by legislators or by judges. If the Supreme Court rules that Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris had the right to certify Florida's vote without including manual recounts, George W. Bush is almost certainly the president-elect. If local courts in Florida agree that the votes in Miami-Dade and Palm Beach Counties must be recounted, the president-elect is probably Al Gore. It will shock no one to hear that we would prefer the latter. But we would vastly prefer either to the alternative proposed by many Republicans: that the next president be chosen by the Florida legislature or the U.S. Congress. If conservatives admitted that they are proposing this simply because it would hand Bush the presidency, that would be bad enough. But their efforts to construct an intellectual edifice that justifies a legislative decision as opposed to a judicial one are even worse.

Technically speaking, of course, the Constitution gives state legislatures and the U.S. Congress important roles in choosing our president. It is up to state legislatures to appoint presidential electors; it is up to Congress to accept them and, when there is no majority, to choose the president on its own. But these procedures are vestiges of a long-antiquated vision of American government in which primary decision-making is left not to the people but to deliberative bodies of elites. And, in the last century, these rules rightly became mere formalities. States came to choose electors based strictly on the popular vote. The House accepted them in rigid accordance with the same principle. And everyone basically agreed that this change showed the progress of our democracy. Until last week, that is, when the Florida Supreme Court ruled against the Republicans.

As soon as Florida's high court ordered Harris, a Republican, to consider hand recounts of ballots in several disputed counties, Bush and his supporters started attacking the legitimacy of the judiciary. They did not merely say the decision was ill-conceived; they said the court didn't have the right to make it. They lashed out at "the imperial judiciary," accusing the court of writing law rather than interpreting it. Noting that all the sitting justices were Democratic appointees, they did their best to paint the court as just another partisan institution trying to tilt the election for the benefit of its party. Finally, they began contemplating ways to undermine the judiciary's role in the election altogether. The Republican leadership of the Florida legislature threatened to appoint state electors committed to Bush, while filing a brief with the U.S. Supreme Court denying that state or federal courts even have the right to review electoral practices. Not to be outdone, House Majority Leader Dick Armey and House Majority Whip Tom DeLay warned that if Gore were to claim Florida's electoral votes and the election, they would reject the results in the House.

On the specifics of the case, it's arguable the Republicans were right: The Florida Supreme Court may have indeed overstepped its authority. And the Bush campaign had every right to appeal the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. But the GOP's attacks on the judiciary itself, to say nothing of their threats to thwart it, are based on a convenient and dangerous fiction—that laws are entirely self-explanatory and efforts to interpret their meaning amount to a seizure of power by unelected judges. You needn't be a fan of Earl Warren to see the problem here: Laws are rarely unambiguous. Lawmakers cannot foresee every contingency when they write statutes; and, furthermore, laws often conflict with one another.

When judges interpret laws, of course their decisions are somewhat subjective. And of course that subjectivity allows room for ideological predisposition. But *somebody* has to settle these matters. And, alone among other public officials, higher-court judges really do function in the manner that the nation's founders envisaged for elites in the Constitution. Though appointed by partisan politicians, they enjoy lifetime tenure and operate under strictures of political neutrality. In so doing, they lend our entire system a crucial sense of legitimacy.

The Republicans pushing a legislative solution to this crisis seem oblivious to that, in part because they have been deeply (and in some cases rightly) angered by recent judicial activism on a whole host of issues and, more to the point, because they happen to control both the Florida statehouse and the U.S. Congress. But one day the courts may start interpreting laws in ways conservatives find more congenial. And Republicans won't control the legislatures forever. Someday they, too, may come to recognize the virtues of an independent judiciary whose power all partisans revere. Too bad they don't now. ■

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NOTEBOOK

WHEN IN NEW MEXICO...: It has become one of the most familiar rituals of Indecision 2000. A Bush surrogate—James Baker, Bob Dole, you name it—trots to the microphones to condemn the Gore campaign's efforts "to keep recounting until it happens to like the result." Team Bush has been particularly contemptuous of the Democrats' recent efforts to reexamine 10,000 "undervotes" in Miami-Dade County, ballots on which voters made no choice for president but picked candidates for lower office. "It is wrong, simply wrong," fumes consigliere Baker, "to say ... that these votes have never been counted." Adds Montana Governor Marc Racicot, fast toadying his way up George W. Bush's Cabinet list, "I think it's very unfortunate and it's inaccurate to reflect that there are 10,000 ballots in Miami-Dade County that weren't counted. There simply were no votes that were cast for the president in that particular election, and, as a consequence of that, they can't in fact count." One might even believe the Republicans meant it—at least until Tuesday, when GOP officials in New Mexico asked the state canvassing board to delay the state's official certification for Al Gore for two more days so they could decide whether to demand a recount. The reason? A "highly unusual" ratio (10 percent) of undervotes in the Republican county of Roosevelt. Perhaps the Bushies should hire David Boies to plead their case.

THE GRASS IS ALWAYS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC: Even by the standards of the last three weeks, the defense of the Florida secretary of state published in this week's *Economist* was a masterpiece of misdirection. In making the case that Katherine Harris is a "respectable politician who has been put in an impossible situation," the magazine points out that at least "Mrs. Harris had the decency to telegraph her intentions to the country before her ruling on November 14th." Er, not exactly. If memory serves, it was Harris who gave several Florida counties until 2 p.m. on November 15 to make their arguments for postponing the deadline on manual recounts. That she would "telegraph her intentions" before hearing those arguments suggests something other than "decency"—specifically, that she never planned to consider the requests in the first place. But, the puckish Brits note approvingly, at least no one could confuse Harris for one of those Bush shills who'd do anything for the family's good favor. Why? "As by far the richest member of [Jeb Bush's] cabinet, she is least awed by his family connections." Hmm. That would be the same Harris who co-chaired Dubya's campaign in Florida, went door-to-door for his primary effort in New Hampshire, tried to deny Pat Buchanan a spot on the Florida ballot, and lobbied for a job in a Bush administration. "It is hard," concludes the magazine, "not to feel sympathetic." Depends on how hard you're trying.

THE ADVANCE IS HOW MUCH?: "The first lady also said that she is done talking about her personal life."—John Roberts, CBS News, August 5, 1999

"And, you know, I'm—I'm old-fashioned enough not to talk about my private life...."—Hillary Clinton to Dan Rather, CBS News, August 31, 1999

"Many others have imputed thoughts and feelings to me, and I'd like to have a chance to sort my own out and to share those and to talk about what it has been like, the highs and the lows of being part of history, as I have been."—Hillary Clinton, noting in a radio interview that she'd like "to write


YOUR HONOR, YOUR RULING ON THE ELECTION IS INVALID BECAUSE YOUR GAVEL ONLY HIT THE OUTSIDE 1/4 OF THE WOODEN BLOCK, NOT THE 3/4 REQUIRED BY LAW.
OBJECTION
MY INTENTION WAS...
TOO LATE!
OBJECTION
TOLES
©2000 THE NEW REPUBLIC

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

about" impeachment and her troubled marriage, WAMU-FM, November 28, 2000

OH ... WHATEVER: "[A]ny appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court would be denied."—David Boies, *The Washington Post*, November 25

"I don't think it's surprising at all for the United States Supreme Court to hear that case."—Boies, CNN, November 24

PICTURE THIS—A CHERISHED UNCLE IS TRAPPED ON AN ICEBERG SURROUNDED BY KILLER WHALES: "To imagine what [Bush and Gore] have been going through, put yourself into this scenario: A cherished member of your family has disappeared—a spouse, a parent or child. She did not arrive at your home when she was due, and hours later you report her missing to the police. Time passes and there is no word of her whereabouts. Then the phone rings and a police dispatcher says, 'We've found her and we're bringing her home.' An hour later, another call: 'Sorry, the woman we located is not your missing person.'"—David Broder, *The Washington Post*, November 28

THEY ONLY SAID THEY'D TRY: "Although we do not care about the man who holds the office, Republicans do have respect for the office. Therefore, we will try to give the president all the dignity his office is entitled during his visit."—Nebraska GOP Chair Chuck Sigerson, commenting on Bill Clinton's upcoming visit to the state, his first as president, in the *Lincoln Journal Star*, November 29

"As I said before, Nebraska is proud of our Clinton-free air, our Clinton-free waters, and our Clinton-free morals. It will never be the same after Clinton visits here."—Sigerson, same day, same paper, same article

FORECAST CALLS FOR SCATTERED LEGAL ACTIVITY WITH A 60 PERCENT CHANCE OF PARTISANSHIP: "If close elections were hurricanes, this one would be a Category 5."—*San Francisco Chronicle*, November 29

"Last week's legal wrangling moved as fast as a hurricane through the Florida Keys, but in substance it was also as murky as a mangrove swamp."—*U.S. News & World Report*, November 27

"Thus ended a day that was centered, appropriately, in a concrete bunker built by Palm Beach County to withstand hurricanes. This time, the swirling currents were political, although they came with a gale force all their own."—*Los Angeles Times*, November 27

"The relative calm in the Florida election hurricane yesterday gave the nation what it needed—a chance to catch its breath. But the political storm continued to gather...."—New York *Daily News*, November 19

"'This isn't a hurricane,' said Dexter Douglass, who is pressing Gore's case with rhetorical flair. 'This is a north Florida cyclone with a hurricane attached that is going to sweep across the country.'"—*USA Today*, November 17

"There is no guarantee that any of this recounting will ultimately have any legal standing. As *The Wall Street Journal* said, 'There's a legal hurricane in Florida.'"—ABC's *World News Tonight*, November 15 ■

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In Florida, the Greens have second thoughts.

Mourning After

By Franklin Foer

During the campaign, many observers (including some writing in this magazine) prophesied that the horror of a Bush presidency would send renegade lefties scurrying back in the Democrats' direction. It hasn't taken that long. George W. Bush isn't yet president, but the dress rehearsal he's conducted over the past month has already convinced many supporters of Ralph Nader that—lo and behold—there is a difference between Gush and Bore after all. Too bad they had to throw a handful of states (including, apparently, Florida) to Bush to figure that out.

Take Medea Benjamin, the Green Party's Senate candidate from California. A few months ago, Benjamin was blasting Al Gore and the Democrats for "taking marching orders from corporate bosses." But just two days after garnering 3 percent in her own race, Benjamin was on a plane to Florida, where she spent the next twelve days demanding a revote and denouncing the partisan chicanery of Republican Secretary of State Katherine Harris. "This could be a moment for people power," she told me. "This should be taken into the streets." And, indeed, the Greens have been doing just that. The website of the Florida Green Party offers nearly a dozen advertisements for pro-Gore rallies. As Benjamin said, a bit boastfully, "You'd be shocked at all the activists wearing Green Party T-shirts to these demonstrations."

Does this mean the Greens admit that it matters who wins? Oh, no, they insist; they're just standing up for an essential fairness that knows no partisanship. But that's nonsense. The Naderite arguments about the recount mirror the Democratic ones. And they follow the same guiding principle: It would be better if Gore won.

Naderite pundits like talk-show host Jim Hightower have lashed Bush for his hypocrisy concerning hand recounts. But, while Hightower argues that "[i]n a democracy your vote ought to be counted," it's pretty clear that the votes he and other Greens are referring to are the ones for Gore. Numerous Greens have demanded complete hand recounts in Palm Beach and Miami-Dade Counties. The website of lefty mag *Mother Jones*, which posted numerous paeans to Nader during the campaign, now decries the GOP's "long effort to disenfranchise black voters." Even the International Committee of the Fourth International's World Socialist Web Site, which applauded Nader's challenge, has blasted the "Republican-led attack on democratic rights."

But, if it's the principle that matters and not Gore's chances of winning, why are the Greens silent on the military voters whose overseas ballots have also been discounted? The Naderites barely raise the topic. And when they do it's to bash the Bushies once again. Naderite journalist Barbara Ehrenreich, for instance, has decried as "alarming" Republican rhetoric on behalf of military voters. The Greens have even taken this convenient opportunity to decry the electoral college on Gore's behalf. "He did win the popular vote," says Benjamin, "and that ought to be enough."

Of Gore's apostates, none has attacked the Republicans more shrilly than filmmaker Michael Moore. For months, Moore served as Nader's campaign jester, introducing the candidate at rallies and mocking his opponents as identical corporate tools. "These two candidates are the same person," he liked to joke. Since election night, however, he seems to have discovered that perhaps they're not. As the late returns from Florida rolled in, he sent an e-mail urging his allies to "RAISE HOLY BLOODY HELL!!!" so that Gore could "take his seat in the Oval Office." Moore's rhetoric has only escalated since then. He has written an open letter to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan asking him to act against the "massive election fraud [that] is taking place in an area that looks like a banana republic." And on November 11 he sent out an e-mail message—comparing the travails of Jewish seniors in Palm Beach to *Kristallnacht*—that would make Robert Wexler blanch: "I will not allow those who survived [the Holocaust] to come here to this 'land of the free' to be abused again."

What's caused the Naderites' volte-face? In part, they've been animated by charges of racial discrimination against black voters in Florida. While the rest of the nation focuses obsessively on the merits of dimpled chads, the Greens have seized upon early reports of Haitian and poor black voters turned away from polls by bigoted cops. *The Nation*'s Bruce Shapiro, a vocal Nader admirer, has written that "Jesse Jackson, far from overreaching, was right to connect the stakes in Florida's vote count to Selma and Freedom Summer." On *Z* magazine's website, among the homilies to Nader and Noam Chomsky, a dispatch from Florida warns, "We may need you to come south once more and help us win this battle."

The Florida conflict also plays nicely into the Naderites' conspiratorial worldview, in which elections are routinely stolen by corporate interests, and the will of the people (which they take to be somewhere to the left of Maxine Waters) is consistently denied. "In this election there were millions of voters disenfranchised," says Miami Green Party coordinator Alan Kobrin. "We understand from firsthand experience the problems with the electoral system."

Of course, it's not hard to come up with a different explanation for the Naderites' sudden explosion of support for Al Gore: guilt. They may, after all, have cost Gore the election. And with this awareness has come the realization that the key argument of Nader's candidacy—that there's no difference between Democrats and Republicans—is rubbish. Implicit in all of the Greens' Florida complaints is the idea that their true enemy is the Republican Party, which they imagine (in typical over-the-top fashion) to be suppressing black voters, demagoguing military issues, abusing Holocaust survivors, and so forth. They've even belatedly recognized that the corporate interests they spent the campaign inveighing against were far from disinterested in its outcome. Following the selection of Andy Card as Bush's White House chief of staff this week, longtime Naderite Joan Clay-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

brook came forward to condemn his ties to the automobile industry. "This is like a dream come true" for automakers, she told *The Wall Street Journal*. Presumably an administration beholden to John Sweeney might not be.

With so many Naderites echoing the Democratic line, it's almost a relief to find one who remains obstinately committed to the disastrous candidacy: Nader himself. The man most responsible for the GOP's probable ascendance continues to insist that the outcome of the election remains an irrelevancy that might as well be settled with the flip of a coin. It's good to know there's still someone who refuses to let facts stand in the way of principle. ■

Belgrade Dispatch

Balkan Ghost

By JOSHUA HAMMER *and* ZORAN CIRJAKOVIC

LOOMING OVER THE Sava River in Belgrade's new district, the Sava Convention Center was once the site of some of Slobodan Milosevic's biggest self-celebrations. A glass-and-concrete pyramid adjacent to the Intercontinental Hotel, the hall played host to gatherings of party hacks and foreign dignitaries throughout the despot's 13-year rule of Yugoslavia. Last Saturday, a whiff of nostalgia was in the air. Twenty-four hundred faithful gathered there for the Fifth Extraordinary Congress of the Serbian Socialist Party—Slobo's coming-out bash after two months of disgrace and seclusion.

The scene was a far cry from the Socialists' glory days. The giant video screens that once featured close-ups of Milosevic's pompadour-topped visage were nowhere to be seen. Gone were the leaders of fellow pariah states such as Laos, Iraq, and North Korea, who were once flown first-class to Belgrade to pay homage to Milosevic. Almost all the senior members of the Socialist leadership have resigned in recent weeks. And the party's finances are in such bad shape that the convention had to be shortened from its usual three days to one, to save $30,000 on the hall rental fee.

Milosevic, however, was in fine form. Surrounded by hulking bodyguards, the dictator-turned-opposition-leader delivered a stinging rebuke of those who deposed him, Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica and his gang of "traitors, spies, and foreign mercenaries." The new Serb leadership, Milosevic exclaimed to robust applause, stands for "the secession of Montenegro, Kosovo, and Vojvodina, the annihilation of the Serbian people, and the extradition of national heroes to the new Gestapo in The Hague."

Thankfully, though, rhetorical flourishes are about the only weapon Milosevic has left these days. On the surface, little has changed in Serbia. Two central figures behind the war in Kosovo—Army Chief of Staff Nebojsa Pavkovic and Serbian Secret Police Chief Rade Markovic—remain in command. Another Milosevic loyalist, fellow indicted war criminal Milan Milutinovic, still holds the post of Serbian president. Milosevic and his wife, Mirjana Markovic, continue to dwell in splendor in their Tito-era villa in Belgrade's Dedinje neighborhood. But, like an old mafia don, the deposed despot is clinging to a few ceremonial trappings while his enemies plot his final exit. According to a recent poll, nearly 70 percent of Serbs favor Milosevic's arrest and trial, in either The Hague or a domestic court, and the pressure on Kostunica to move against him is growing intense. The endgame's catalyst will probably be the December 23 national election, when Serbs go to the polls to choose a new parliament. Milosevic's Socialists will likely be crushed, losing their last remaining positions in government. At that point, most observers believe, Kostunica and his ally Zoran Djindjic will have no excuse to delay what only a few months ago had been utterly unthinkable: locking Milosevic up.

THE SPEED OF Milosevic's fall has been breathtaking. Once an object of the state-controlled media's slavish devotion, he's now subjected to daily ridicule in the press. Belgrade's tabloids expose the greed of his inner circle, publishing photos of the family villa in Greece and a report on the alleged illegal sale of four state-owned airplanes by Milutinovic for $8 million. Other papers provide lurid details about Milosevic family dysfunction—like Mirjana Markovic's reliance on a star-crossed Indian astrologer who advised her that September 24 would be an auspicious date for the presidential election. Belgrade's most popular tabloid recently reported that building inspectors had shown up at Milosevic's private residence on Tolstoy Street, demanding to check up on rumored illegal construction. Slobo's bodyguards managed to prevent them from entering the compound, but not before the inspectors warned that if the ex-despot didn't secure the necessary permits for the construction within 60 days, "the bulldozers will go to work." The next day a Serbian tabloid ran the headline "MILOSEVIC HOUSE TO BE DESTROYED."

Milosevic's rare forays onto Belgrade streets bring him even more humiliation. As he stepped out of his Mercedes in front of the convention center last Saturday morning, a young female reporter pushed past his bodyguards and asked him point-blank if he expected to be arrested soon. Milosevic's face froze, and a half-dozen goons assaulted the reporter and attempted to seize her tape recorder.

Granted, the fact that Milosevic is feeling the heat doesn't mean his allies are. In fact, the likely power struggle between Djindjic, the Democratic Party leader who backed this summer's triumphant anti-Milosevic campaign, and Kostunica, the man he helped bring to power, has left them both wooing Socialist Party elites. According to informed sources, Kostunica's biggest fear is that he will become known as Serbia's Gorbachev: the man who made the revolution possible but was then swept aside by more charismatic politicians, including Djindjic and Montenegrin president Milo

JOSHUA HAMMER is *Newsweek*'s Berlin bureau chief and author of *Chosen By God: A Brother's Journey*. ZORAN CIRJAKOVIC is *Newsweek*'s Belgrade correspondent.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Djukanovic. "Kostunica is using all of Milosevic's people in his struggle against Djindjic," says Aleksandra Rankovic, a correspondent with the independent news agency Beta.

But whoever comes out on top will be under enormous public pressure to move against Milosevic swiftly. "This must be settled very quickly after the elections," says Rankovic. "Milosevic must be arrested, and all of us must face what he did in the past. We are all waiting for that." Early concerns that Milosevic loyalists among the police would protect him from arrest have dissipated; the much-feared Rade Markovic has pledged his loyalty to the new president and offered to resign "the moment Kostunica tells me to." The only figure who doesn't seem to realize the end is near is Milosevic himself. At last weekend's party convention, he declared that Kostunica had already lost the support of the people and that the Socialists would soon rise again. "The Socialist Party was the biggest and best party for ten years," he thundered. "Let it be that in the future." It's a song he's likely to keep singing until the police van comes to take him away. ■

Jerusalem Dispatch

Long Division

By YOSSI KLEIN HALEVI

JUST ONE MONTH ago, Israel seemed poised for a grim, but necessary, national consensus. Yasir Arafat's repudiation of Ehud Barak's unprecedented peace offer at Camp David had forced the mainstream left to rethink the continued legitimacy of the Oslo peace process. And the October 12 lynching of two Israeli reservists inside a Ramallah police station gave the emerging consensus emotional force. Arafat's rejectionism, the hysterical hatred of the Palestinian streets despite seven years of peace talks, the assaults by Palestinian police whom Israel had empowered and even armed—all this confirmed the folly of Oslo. Israelis, who more than a decade ago abandoned the fantasy of Greater Israel, were now rejecting the fantasy of a new Middle East as well.

Israel's emerging consensus awaited political ratification, the fulfillment of Barak's promise to heal a divided nation. The prime minister began negotiations with Likud for a national unity government that would convey resolve to Israel's enemies—embodying a growing Israeli center that regrets both indiscriminate settlement-building and the empowerment of Arafat's militias minutes from downtown Israel.

But then Barak hesitated. He refused Likud's demand that he formally void the concessions he made at Camp David. Instead, he began pursuing ever more hopeless cease-fires with Arafat. And he secretly made yet another deal with the ultra-Orthodox Shas, capitulating to precisely the fundamentalist blackmail many Israelis had elected him to stop.

Now all his desperate manipulations have collapsed. Barak has failed to form a strong and principled government with Likud and hasn't succeeded in forming even a weak and cynical one with Shas. Israel is headed for a bitter and pointless election that no one wants and that will likely end Barak's short and remarkably disappointing political career. As guerrilla war transforms the West Bank into Lebanon, car bombs explode in our cities, and Hezbollah tries to provoke a regional war on our northern border, Israelis will be turning their rage and frustration against each other.

TO SOME EXTENT, the fratricide has already begun. By failing to acknowledge the death of Oslo, Barak helped the left rehabilitate itself. Ironically, the peace camp has now rationalized the Camp David failure by blaming the prime minister himself. Barak's mistake, his leftist critics now insist, was trying to reach a final-status agreement—that is, daring to test the premise that the Oslo process would actually lead to peace. Instead, argues the left, Barak should have opted for another interim agreement, even though that would have meant ceding most of the territories and leaving Israel with few bargaining chips when the crucial issues of Jerusalem and refugees were finally confronted. Or, concluded the critics, if he wanted a final deal, he should have gone all the way—offering not just upward of 90 percent of the territories and half the Old City of Jerusalem but the full 100 percent: a complete withdrawal to the 1967 borders.

Though wounded and reduced to its hard core, the peace camp has regained its desperate optimism, convinced that the settlements remain the main obstacle to reconciliation. In a recent op-ed, novelist A. B. Yehoshua urged the settlers to show courage and return to the pre-1967 borders. Peace Now ran ads in the Palestinian press calling for almost total Israeli withdrawal and the uprooting of settlements. The Four Mothers movement, which led the campaign for Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, is trying to make a comeback with a similar campaign to abandon the settlements. Having helped convince the Palestinians of the efficacy of Hezbollah-style violence, the Mothers are now promoting a new Israeli norm: abandoning fellow Israelis under fire.

The peace camp's renewal of its campaign against settlements even as Arafat's militias are shooting at settlers has created a bitterness between left and right more acute than at any time since the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. Except that now it's the right that is accusing the left of encouraging, however unwittingly, the murder of fellow Jews—by helping terrorists undermine Israeli unity and morale. Even a moderate like Rabbi Yoel bin-Nun—a founder of the settlement movement who after Rabin's assassination accused fellow rabbis of murderous incitement and initiated a desperate one-man dialogue with the left to preserve Jewish unity—has turned against his left-wing partners. By labeling settlers as criminals, he wrote in the newspaper *Ha'aretz*, the left has encouraged terrorist attacks against them. "The settlers are caught in a cross fire: verbal fire from the Israeli left and live fire from Palestinian ambushes," he wrote. "There is no dialogue and no partnership with inciters who lend legitimacy to the murder of settlers."

The left's renewed campaign against settlements isn't convincing the mainstream. Even after two months of fighting

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that have produced approximately as many Israeli casualties as Lebanon did in all of last year, a recent poll conducted by *Ma'ariv* shows that 58 percent of Israelis favor defending isolated settlements and only 33 percent support immediate withdrawal. Part of the reason the public refuses to blame the settlements for the intifada is Barak's concessions at Camp David. The settlers' cause has also been bolstered by the sustained shooting into the East Jerusalem Jewish neighborhood of Gilo—which Palestinians call a settlement but which almost all Jewish Israelis consider an integral part of Israel, a suburban neighborhood housing Israelis from across the political spectrum. The attacks on Gilo have convinced many Israelis that the Palestinian war wouldn't stop even if all 200,000 West Bank settlers were evacuated but would instead continue against East Jerusalem's additional 200,000 Jewish residents.

Israelis' rejection of the peace camp's worldview can be seen in their reaction to the recent bombing of a settlers' school bus in Gaza, which killed two adults and seriously wounded three siblings from the Cohen family. While some on the dogmatic left dwell on the fact that the Cohen family lives in Kfar Darom, an isolated Gaza settlement, the rest of the nation has embraced the Cohen children as Israel's new symbols in the war against terrorism. Soccer and pop music stars and Israel's gold medalist in the recent Paralympics (an international Special Olympics held this year in Australia) have all joined the daily pilgrimage to the children's hospital beds.

Still, sympathy for the settlers doesn't translate into acceptance of their political agenda. Most Israelis still believe isolated settlements must eventually be evacuated. They just don't want to withdraw under fire, as the left is now urging, because they rightly perceive that to do so would invite further violent blackmail.

A majority of Israelis could probably be convinced to favor withdrawal based on one of two conditions: as part of a comprehensive peace agreement or as part of a decision to end the peace process and impose unilateral security borders. After Camp David, only the second option still remains, which helps explain why most Israelis crave national unity. As Tommy Lapid, leader of the militantly secular Shinui Party and a strong backer of a unity government, puts it: "The right of the right is pulling rightward, the left of the left is pulling leftward, and no one is in the center except the decisive majority of the people of Israel."

Having eschewed a national unity government and plunged Israel into elections, Barak has linked his political fate to a deal with Arafat. Barak says that, for now at least, he accepts the impossibility of a final-status deal that would lead to formal peace and is working toward another interim agreement with Arafat. But that means convincing Israelis to accept a deal that includes establishing a Palestinian state, ceding most of the territories, uprooting settlements, and risking intra-Jewish violence—all in exchange for a cease-fire. Though 50 percent of Israelis, according to a *Yediot Aharonot* poll, say they would vote for a theoretical peace treaty, it won't be peace that Barak is offering.

While a national unity government would have put Arafat on the defensive, Barak's push to resume talks before next May's planned election has substantially strengthened the Palestinian chairman, who has skillfully played on Barak's desperation. In meetings with Israeli ministers and in phone conversations with Barak and U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Arafat repeatedly promises to reduce the level of violence. Usually those promises come after a terrorist atrocity and succeed in deflating Israeli determination to retaliate. Immediately after a bus bombing in the northern town of Hadera, for instance, Barak accused Arafat of personal responsibility for the attack. But then Arafat signaled a readiness to lower the violence. Barak, who had called an emergency meeting of his security cabinet to determine Israel's military response, decided not to retaliate.

Now, as the first step toward an election-era deal, Barak has ordered a series of "confidence-building" measures, including reopening the Palestinian Authority's Gaza airport. In exchange, Arafat has arrested Hamas members suspected of involvement in the Hadera attack—whom he'll no doubt release when the need arises. That is the kind of psychological warfare we will be subjected to in the coming months, as Barak polarizes the electorate with promises of a peace he himself no longer believes in. Little wonder that Benjamin Netanyahu, who doesn't even head Likud, is beating Barak in every poll by up to 20 percent.

Still, even if Likud wins, the result may be a national unity government anyway, since only a unity government would have the authority to implement Israel's least disastrous option: unilateral withdrawal to secure borders that would uproot isolated settlements; Palestinian self-government; and a united Jerusalem under Israeli rule. Astonishingly, even Shimon Peres, who may run against Barak in the Labor primaries, is quietly telling associates he'd join such a coalition with Netanyahu. Ehud Barak came to power by promising to unite a divided nation. He's lost his chance. Hopefully that promise will be fulfilled in his absence. ■

Why Bush and Gore are behaving like statesmen.

One Fine Mess

By Cass R. Sunstein

The horror. That seems to be most pundits' verdict on this post-campaign campaign. Both candidates, sober-minded observers agree, have behaved terribly, trying to twist and mangle the law to their own selfish ends. "Al Gore and George W. Bush," admonished *The Boston Globe*, "should, for once, start acting like statesmen." And then there's Florida's sorry excuse for election law. "I mean, Florida election law," griped CBS News legal analyst Andrew Cohen, "if [there's] nothing else we can agree on, we can agree that it was just absolutely a disaster."

Actually, we can't, and we shouldn't. The last three weeks

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have been trying, but not because Florida is a banana republic and not because of anything the Gore and Bush campaigns have done in court. In fact, the great neglected story of November has been the eminent reasonableness of almost every legal position the Gore and Bush campaigns have taken, and the eminent reasonableness (if ambiguity) of the very Florida election law both campaigns are fighting over.

It's possible to disagree with the legal arguments put forward by the two camps; but they are neither reckless nor absurd, and the frequent suggestion that they are says more about the instinctive cynicism of many commentators than about the arguments' legal merits. The Gore campaign's request for manual recounts in four Democratic counties—Broward, Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, and Volusia—was widely condemned as illegitimate, a form of sour grapes. But Florida law explicitly authorizes manual recounts, and the Gore campaign was well within its rights to insist on them. Whether or not manual recounts are reliable, or more reliable than machine counts, Florida law makes them fully available to disappointed candidates.

By the same token, it was quite reasonable for the Bush campaign and Florida's much-reviled secretary of state, Katherine Harris, to interpret Florida law as forbidding Harris to receive returns after November 14. A provision of Florida law plainly says that if county returns are not received by that day, "all missing counties shall be ignored, and the results shown by the returns on file shall be certified." To be sure, a separate provision proclaims that such returns "may be ignored," but that provision could easily be read to allow the secretary of state to ignore late returns.

The Gore lawyers disagreed. They argued that the "may be ignored" provision, because it was enacted by the legislature more recently, trumps the "shall be ignored" one. And they claimed, rightly, that even if late returns "may be ignored," the secretary of state cannot do so arbitrarily. She has to explain herself. Most important of all, Florida's explicit and detailed provisions for manual recounts would be rendered meaningless in populous areas, where recounting is slow, if the secretary of state were free to "ignore" returns filed after a week's time. In these circumstances, the Florida Supreme Court's decision to read the "may be ignored" language together with the manual-recount provision, to ensure that manually recounted votes are not "ignored," was entirely justifiable.

And so was the Bush campaign's appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. Many legal analysts thought it ridiculous to suggest that the hand-recount dispute raised federal, as opposed to state, issues. But federal law appears to require that electors be chosen in accordance with state law enacted by the legislature "prior to" the election. If you believe, as the Bush campaign does, that the Florida Supreme Court changed state law, then there is a genuine federal issue.

Similarly, the Gore camp has real grounds on which to contest the secretary of state's November 26 certification. Florida law seems to require that county canvassing boards conduct a manual recount if sampling shows an error in the machine tabulation; and an error does seem to have occurred in Miami-Dade. But the Bush campaign has a plausible response: The law says a canvassing board "may" conduct a manual recount, not that it "shall." If a canvassing board refuses to conduct a manual recount because it cannot finish by the lawful deadline, isn't it obeying the law?

Are both sides right? Of course not. But both sides are making sensible arguments that have substantial legal merit; they're not clogging up the courts with fanciful, transparent sophistries—which is the impression you might get from watching television. In fact, Gore and Bush both have arguments so serious that their lawyers might be remiss if they *didn't* bring them to court. How can both sides have strong arguments? Because, on many key questions, Florida election law is unclear.

Which is why trashing Florida election law is rapidly becoming a new national sport. To be sure, if we were sending the election law of one U.S. state to a fledgling democracy to show how things should be done, we probably wouldn't choose Florida's. But the pundits who keep bemoaning the lack of clarity of the Sunshine State's electoral statutes should remember a couple of things. First, on the vast majority of issues, Florida election law is quite clear; it's served the state fairly well through many campaigns. Yes, the unbelievably anomalous election of 2000 has exposed several pressure points—provisions that reasonable people can read in different ways. But legislatures have limited foresight; they can never predict every circumstance that will arise when there's a near tie. Even well-crafted laws are potentially ambiguous; if they were self-explanatory, we wouldn't need a judiciary to interpret them.

Indeed, the real lesson here is not that Florida law is a complete mess but that an independent arbiter (such as a judge) imposes a needed discipline on what people say and how they say it. Unlike in the political arena, where both sides have engaged in gross hyperbole and never-ending spin, in the legal domain both sides—in their briefs and inside courtrooms—have restricted themselves to solid arguments about hard questions. If only those outside the courtroom—for instance, the press—would do the same. ■

The Supreme Court puts itself in harm's way.

Judge Not

By JEFFREY ROSEN

ALMOST AS SOON as the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear *Bush* v. *Palm Beach*, the questions the justices framed already seemed tangential. The Court had intervened at a moment of great anxiety for George W. Bush. The Florida Supreme Court had just ordered the Republican secretary of state, Katherine Harris, to accept hand recounts—and it appeared that those recounts might allow Al Gore to take the lead. This could have ignited a conflict between the Florida Supreme Court and Harris, who insisted she was required by law not to consider

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hand recounts after the original deadline for receiving them. The Bush campaign appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, asking it to overturn the Florida Supreme Court and to invalidate the hand counts. But justices are no better than journalists at keeping up with this fast-moving story, and by the time the briefs were filed the case already appeared to be beside the point. The manual recounts the Bush campaign so feared had failed to produce a Gore victory. While Gore has continued to fight by contesting the election in the Florida courts, his suits can proceed regardless of what the U.S. Supreme Court says in *Bush* v. *Palm Beach*.

So the Court has very little to gain by intervening in this case. But it has a great deal to lose. The central question right now is the potential conflict between the Florida courts and the Florida legislature about who gets to appoint electors. This conflict will arise if Gore wins his contest suit and the Florida Supreme Court awards him the state's electoral votes, while the Florida legislature simultaneously appoints its own set of electors for Bush. The federal law that tells Congress how to resolve this dispute is the same one at issue in *Bush* v. *Palm Beach*. In theory, therefore, the Court could use the case to clarify the meaning of that law.

It could. But it shouldn't. This is a moment of peril for the Supreme Court. If it presumes to tell Congress how to resolve the electoral crisis, the Court will unmask itself as no less ideologically divided than every other institution this battle has touched. The justices need to escape the trap they have set for themselves, and they can do so without losing face: by recognizing that disputes about presidential electors are a political question that the Constitution assigns to Congress rather than the courts.

This would mean rejecting Bush's central claim. But that's OK, because Bush's claim is extremely weak. He argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should vacate the Florida Supreme Court decision because it fails to comply with the Electoral Count Act of 1887. Section Five of that law says that if any state has passed laws before Election Day providing for a "final determination of any controversy or contest" concerning the appointment of electors by "judicial or other methods or proceedings," those proceedings shall be binding on Congress when it counts electoral votes, as long as the "final determination" occurs by December 12.

The Electoral Count Act was designed to avoid a reprise of the Hayes-Tilden debacle of 1876, when the state of Florida submitted two slates of electors—one for Hayes, certified by the Republican canvassing board, and one for Tilden, certified by the Democratic legislature. Congress embarrassed itself when it appointed a bipartisan commission of senators, representatives, and Supreme Court justices to choose among the competing slates, after which both Houses split over whether or not to accept the commission's ideologically divided report. To ensure that Congress wouldn't face this dilemma again, the Electoral Count Act tried to give states an incentive to enact laws for resolving election controversies *before* the election. Florida did just that when it passed a series of laws regulating presidential elections and gave the state's courts the power to interpret them.

Bush argues that the Florida Supreme Court's decision shouldn't be respected, because the court changed Florida election law rather than interpreting it. I happen to think the Florida Supreme Court went too far in changing the counting standards and announcing a new deadline for Harris to meet, rather than ordering her to accept the results of manual recounts and letting her set a new deadline herself. But even people who disagree with aspects of the court's decision should reject Bush's claim that the court was legislating rather than interpreting. Attempting to reconcile legal ambiguities is what courts do all the time, and the Supreme Court has no business second-guessing a state court's interpretation of its own law merely because the interpretation is open to question.

Even assuming the Florida Supreme Court changed Florida law, however, the Florida judges can't have violated the Electoral Count Act, because the Electoral Count Act doesn't require the Florida Supreme Court to do anything at all. It is directed at the U.S. Congress, not at the Florida courts. Specifically, it tells Congress which votes to count in the event there are competing slates of electors; it doesn't authorize the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve controversies

ROBERT NEUBECKER

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the state courts and state legislature are trying to resolve on their own. For this reason, Gore argues convincingly, the U.S. Supreme Court can't order any remedy even if it thinks the Florida Supreme Court changed the law. By dismissing the case as a political question, the Court could acknowledge that it has no authority to resolve the dispute.

What if we get a reprise of the Hayes-Tilden fiasco and two competing slates of electors emerge before December 12—one for Bush, certified by the Florida legislature, and the other for Gore, certified by the Florida Supreme Court? Then we'd be back to the ambiguities in the Electoral Count Act. Section Two of the act declares that "[w]henever any State has held an election for the purpose of choosing electors, and has failed to make a choice on the day prescribed by law, the electors may be appointed on a subsequent day in such a manner as the legislature of such State may direct." Since Florida failed to choose electors on November 7, the Florida legislature now claims that it has the power to appoint Bush electors whenever it likes and that Congress has to respect its choice. But this is hard to reconcile with Section Five of the Electoral Count Act, which says state judicial proceedings "shall be conclusive" in the electoral count, as long as they are finalized by December 12.

On the merits, there's a strong argument that if dueling slates emerge before December 12, Congress is required by Section Five to recognize the slate certified by the Florida courts rather than the one certified by the legislature. But, in practice, this mandate seems unenforceable by the Supreme Court, since Congress would have to choose the wrong slate before it could be sued for violating the Electoral Count Act. This is yet another reason for the Supreme Court to emphasize that the ultimate meaning of the Electoral Count Act is a political question assigned to Congress rather than the courts.

By making clear that it is not willing to spare Congress the need to make this choice, the Supreme Court could increase its legitimacy by refusing to exercise its power, much as it did in *Marbury* v. *Madison*, when it held that Congress acted unconstitutionally in giving the Court power to order Secretary of State James Madison to deliver a commission. Last week, when they intervened in this political dispute, the justices made a dangerous mistake; they now risk embarrassing themselves and the country. By getting out of the controversy as quickly as possible, they can preserve their own carefully cultivated aura of neutrality at a time when the other branches of national government are sadly abandoning their own. ■

The method to the GOP's madness.

Counterpunch

By Ryan Lizza

PALM BEACH, FLORIDA

EVER WONDER WHAT happened to Donato Dalrymple, the so-called fisherman who scooped Elián González out of the Atlantic Ocean a year ago? After being photographed trying to hide the little Cuban boy in a closet as federal agents raided the home of Elián's Miami relatives, Dalrymple blessedly dropped out of public view. Until now. On the final night of the manual recounts in South Florida, *el pescador* has resurfaced to join the GOP hooligans.

Outside the Palm Beach Emergency Operations Center, Dalrymple and five or six dozen angry pro-Bush demonstrators have surrounded two female Gore supporters and a reporter from *The San Jose Mercury News* who was foolish enough to try to interview them about Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris's decision to certify the election results. As the crowd crushes in around 19-year-old Tara Zapp and her aunt, Mary Jane Zapp, the Bushies tear at the women's GORE-LIEBERMAN signs, chanting, "Murderer!" and "Baby killer!" A man, who later says he is from Miami and was instrumental in disrupting a protest led by Jesse Jackson two weeks ago in West Palm Beach, thrusts a gold-colored megaphone into Mary Jane's ear and screams obscenities. Next, he pushes it toward the ear of the *Mercury News* reporter, Noam Levey, and yells, "Biased press!" Other protesters grab at Tara's arm, trying to smudge off the Gore stencil she has painted on it.

That's when I notice the familiar-looking man with a BUSH-CHENEY sign, chopping one hand through the air and yelling at the two women and the reporter: "No more Gore! Al Gore is a Communist! He supports Castro!" It's *el pescador*! Together with the rest of the Bushies, many of whom are now pushing and shoving the Zapps, Dalrymple succeeds in driving the two Gore supporters off the Operations Center property and across the street. "Leave! Leave!" the crowd chants.

"It is scary when they start touching you," says Mary Jane, now at a safe remove from the tumult. When I ask her whether she recognized Dalrymple, she grows angry. "He's the one who ripped up my sign!" she says. "I knew I knew that face. That's so mean, because I completely supported Elián staying here." (When I later ask Dalrymple if he tore up her sign, he replies, "Did you see me do it?" When I tell him that I didn't, he says, "Then all you have is a lot of hearsay. She just recognized me because I'm a household name.") Watching the cheering Bush backers from across the street as they celebrate Harris's certification of the Florida results, Mary Jane shakes her head. "The longer this goes on," she sighs,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"the more obscene they have gotten."

And the more obscene, the more successful. When the post-election battle started three weeks ago, the Gore campaign seemed to be trouncing Team Bush. Mere hours after the polls closed in Florida, Gore lawyers were already in the Sunshine State, taking depositions and preparing court challenges. The Gore-Lieberman Recount Committee was up and running with a $3 million bank account the day after the election; the Bush campaign didn't create a similar fund until four days later. As Republican Senator Charles Grassley griped to *The New York Times* a week after the election, "[W]hatever the Democrats were doing, we ought to be doing more of it."

But Grassley had it exactly wrong. The Gore campaign was primarily conducting a legal battle, not a political one. The Bush staff, on the other hand, realized that Florida would be won on the streets, not in the courtroom. And they set about doing just that.

In the days after November 7, Gore quickly assembled a dream team of lawyers to argue his case in Florida. But, almost from the beginning, the political advisers who had driven his campaign—people like Bob Shrum and Carter Eskew—were absent from the ground war. "I was on some of the earliest conference calls, and none of those guys were on the line," says one of Gore's recount lawyers. "It seems to me like it was the same people [running things] who came up with 'no controlling legal authority.'" And, while Gore's lawyers masterfully persuaded the Florida Supreme Court to grant manual recounts in three Democratic counties, the Gore recount team, short on people with political acumen, wasn't prepared for what came next.

The Republicans, by contrast, having lost to the Gore camp's scorched-earth legal assault, responded with a scorched-earth political campaign. At the campaign's heart was an all-out effort to discredit and even disrupt the three manual recounts. From Austin and Tallahassee, Bush representatives like Karen Hughes and James Baker assailed the recount as partisan and subjective, blasting the Democratic canvassing board members as tools in Gore's attempt to steal the election.

But more important than the official pronouncements from Austin and Tallahassee was the Republicans' ground operation, which included the now-infamous faux grassroots protests and visits to the recount centers by a stable of GOP luminaries, who dutifully observed and then dutifully condemned the process. Relying on some of the GOP's most ruthless operatives—like Tucker Eskew, Neal Rhodes, Warren Tompkins (who helped Bush bludgeon John McCain *in the South Carolina primary*), and Roger Stone (immortalized in these pages 15 years ago as "the state-of-the-art Washington sleazeball")—the Bush camp set out to do in the political arena what it had failed to do in the courtroom.

FORT LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA

IN DOWNTOWN FORT LAUDERDALE, with about 24 hours left before the certification deadline, the Broward County canvassing board is furiously recounting ballots inside the county courthouse, while dozens of Bush protesters raise hell outside. But the real action is happening a block away, in a Winnebago. That's where Bush operatives are communicating via radio with observers inside the courthouse and with some of the protesters outside, who are outfitted with earpieces and mini-microphones. From the Winnebago, operatives pass out the gear that constitutes the protesters' wardrobes: "crying towels" emblazoned with the SORE-LOSERMAN logo, hats proclaiming BUSH IS AMERICA'S PRESIDENT, and T-shirts that explain HOW TO STEAL AN ELECTION. Says Michael Levy, former chief of staff for RNC Co-chair Pat Harrison who is in Fort Lauderdale helping out, "The truck coordinates everything."

Because of the heavy police presence and the restrictions on access to the proceedings inside the courthouse, the pro-Bush demonstrators here have little opportunity to mount the sort of mini-riot they staged in Miami-Dade the previous Wednesday. Instead, they spend most of the day chanting and taunting a tiny group of unorganized Gore supporters separated from them by barricades, several cops, and 100 feet of asphalt. (The sad state of the Gore campaign's ground game is summed up by one their most prominent signs, which announces, obscurely, BUSH-QUAYLE 2001.)

The Bushies' reputation as an out-of-state "rent-a-mob," as Democrats call them, has made them a tad defensive. Several insist on showing reporters their Florida driver's licenses. But Bradley Clark, a resident of San Jose, California, who



ROBERT KING/NEWSMAKERS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

worked on Poppy's 1992 campaign, proudly tells me, "I'm one of the outside guys here." Just a few days ago, Clark says, he was a recount observer in Broward. Now he's here, chanting, "No more cheating! Certify the vote!" In the GOP's case, the line between sober-minded monitor of the electoral process and screaming street dissident has been obliterated. In Miami-Dade I watched a Republican observer help slow down the recount by repeatedly—and, as it turned out, erroneously—accusing a county employee of double-counting ballots. Today he is here in Fort Lauderdale as a protester with his fist in the air. Later, in Palm Beach, another Republican escorts Virginia Governor Jim Gilmore around the recount; a reporter laughs that he had seen that operative working as a recount observer one day and handing out T-shirts the next.

A woman approaches Clark and begs him to trade his HOW TO STEAL AN ELECTION T-shirt for her FLORIDA BANANA REPUBLIC T-shirt. He declines but escorts her to the Winnebago so she can get her own. As they walk away, they pass beneath a huge placard with a picture of a dog doing his business on a fire hydrant. The punch line reads, THIS IS WHAT I THINK OF GORE AND HIS DIMPLES.

Not long after Clark heads off to the Winnebago, New Jersey Governor Christie Todd Whitman arrives at the courthouse. Whitman is one of many Republican officials already on record decrying the manual recounts as a sham. But she and her fellow dissenters (including Bob Dole, Michigan Governor John Engler, and Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating) are here to observe the sham recount anyway. While the Democrats have picked anonymous lawyers who specialize in recounts to serve as their observers and fight for every pregnant chad, the Republicans rely on a rotating cast of big-name pols who each spend about an hour "observing" the count before holding a press conference condemning what they have witnessed. "Today there was a moment when they had three governors on their side," says David Fink, one of the Democratic lawyers. Engler, he says, actually fell asleep during his stint as an observer the day before. "I was watching him, because he's my governor," insists Fink, who is from Michigan. "He literally couldn't keep his eyes open." Adds Democratic lawyer Chris Sautter, "And then he goes outside and blasts the process as if he knew what was going on."

Whitman, for her part, gets along swimmingly with the canvassing board while inside, according to the lawyers at the table with her. She even compliments them on how well they are running things. But, when she comes out, she faces the cameras and levels the obligatory attacks into the microphones. Then she makes a beeline for the protesters, who are chanting, "We love Christie!" She shakes some hands and a few minutes later slips away in a silver Crown Victoria sedan.

Finally, I can't take it anymore. I have to get inside that Winnebago. I knock three times on the door. A young staffer wearing one of the omnipresent BUSH IS AMERICA'S PRESIDENT hats answers. He politely but firmly rejects my request for a tour of the innards of the truck, declines to give his name, and slams the door in my face. The next day, Harris certifies the results and declares Bush the winner. I still don't know exactly what went on in that truck, but, whatever it was, it worked. ■

The madness in the GOP's method.

Losing It

By JONATHAN CHAIT

IMAGINE THAT THE events last week in Miami had been reversed. A canvassing board counting votes likely to make George W. Bush the next president is besieged by a crowd of Democratic operatives. A Democratic congressman nearby tells his aide to "shut it down," whereupon the throng begins to scream "Cheaters!" and "Fraud!," pounds on the door of the room to which the counters have retreated, and lets it be known that some 1,000 reinforcements, incited by racial appeals on a local radio station, will soon arrive on the scene. The board hastily decides a recount is no longer feasible.

Can anyone seriously doubt what would have happened next? Conservatives would have exploded in outrage, denouncing the triumph of the mob over the rule of law, demanding investigations, declaring any outcome achieved in such a manner to be illegitimate. And they'd be right.

But, far from questioning the Miami riot, conservatives have gone out of their way to justify and even applaud it. The first account of the event, penned by *Wall Street Journal* columnist Paul Gigot, praised Republicans for finally mustering the courage to "fight like Democrats." A subsequent justification by Noemie Emery in *The Weekly Standard* employs the moral logic of the Gambino family, skipping past any consideration of Republican thuggery to linger on Al Gore's "provocation," which consisted of "an invasion of lawyers ... the theater of mobs and protests, the frenzied attacks on public officials, the purposeful suppression of the votes of servicemen, the playing of the race card, and the whipping up of hatred against [Gore's] opponents." All those "provocations," of course, apply equally to the Bush campaign (except, of course, the "suppression" of military votes, which has clear parallels). And surely none of them justifies the violent intimidation of government officials trying to do their legal duty.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Haverhills' Best Sellers*

*But read this ad for an even better deal!

More than just a telescope...more than just a microscope...

Episcope™
(the complete vest-pocket optical system)

still only $59.95*

•Even at its highest magnification of 30x, the Episcope™ resolves as distinctly as any laboratory microscope, yet it is only 2" long. An optical miracle!

Remove the *Episcope*™ from its fitted leather case and it's a 30-power microscope. A twist of the wrist converts it to a 3x telescope, or a unique 3x telescope-loupe. Another twist, and you have a choice of magnifiers and loupes: 5x, 10x, and 15x powers. The *Episcope*™, only 2" long, was developed in Wetzlar (Germany), the home of world-famous Leica cameras; it's now being made by one of Asia's finest lens makers. The optics are superb: brilliant luminosity, needle-sharp focus, absolute planarity, total chromatic correction, and fully anastigmatic. The *Episcope*™ is the first choice of geologists, biologists, numismatists, philatelists, engineers, and just anybody who likes to see the infinite detail in his/her surroundings. It comes with a plastic "tripod" for extended observations at 15x or 30x magnifications. ***Episcope*™ #1062F870a**

Get rid of moles, gophers and other burrowing pests, with...

Mole-Ex VI™
only $59.95*

It's annoying to see your beautiful lawn being ruined by burrowing pests. You may have tried pouring poison down their holes or getting rid of them with other nostrums. Nothing really works. Now comes *Mole-Ex VI*™, the revolutionary electronic solution to this age-old problem. Spike *Mole-Ex VI*™ into your lawn. It emits short, high-pitched shrieks (at the threshold of ultrasound) in 30 sec. intervals. They are barely audible to humans, but they are calibrated to be totally distressing to moles, gophers, and other burrowing pests. They can barely see, but their hearing is fine-tuned. Once they get a blast of *Mole-Ex VI*™, they'll scamper away and will never return. *Mole-Ex VI*™ is the state of the art in the control of burrowing rodents. It's made of virtually indestructible anodized aluminum and tough ABS plastic for years of rugged use. Get *Mole-Ex VI*™: It will get rid of that annoying pest problem once and for all! ***Mole-Ex VI*™ #1056F870b**

•Mole-Ex VI™ *protects about 1,000 sq. yds. against moles, gophers, and other pests. Do not confuse this advanced device with similar looking, but much less sophisticated and less powerful, units! Runs on 4 D-cells (not included).*

Jewels worthy of a czarina...

Faux Fabergé Egg Pendants
only $39.95*

Czar Nicholas II kept master jeweler Carl Fabergé busy producing gorgeous jeweled eggs, to be worn around the necks of the czarina and the princesses. We have replicated these priceless jewels so as to be virtually indistinguishable from the fabled originals. Each Egg is heavily enameled and covered in 22-kt. gold-plated filigree. The Eggs come with 22-kt. gold-plated 22" chains, and are boxed in red-velvet/white-satin presentation cases.

We are one of the few select distributors of these beautiful jewels in the United States and are therefore able to bring them to you at this extraordinary price. Order one red Egg for $39.95 or the **Set** of all three stunning colors (red, green and purple) for only $79.90! **But we have an even better deal:** ***Buy two Sets (six* Eggs) *for $159.80 and we will send you a third* Set *(another three* Eggs *– nine* Eggs *altogether) with our compliments* – **absolutely FREE!** **#1086F870c** for one **(Red)** ***Faux Fabergé Egg (only $39.95)*** **#1087F870d** for the **Set of Three (Red, Green, Purple)** ***Eggs (only $79.90)***

• *Each* Fabergé Egg *measures 1" x 3/4" and comes with a 22" gold-plated chain. They are adorned with 22-kt. gold-plated filigree and Austrian Swarovski crystals – just about the closest thing to real diamonds!*

A spyglass in the great naval tradition...

Adm Nelson's Telescope™
(with table tripod) just $59.95*



•The optics of Admiral Nelson's Telescope™ *are "25x30" which means 25x magnification and the great light gathering capacity of a 30-mm objective lens. Admiral Nelson's telescope was made of brass. This replica is heavily chrome-plated for extra beauty and protection. The scope comes with a belt-looped vinyl carrying case. For permanent mounting, the scope comes with an extendible table tripod.*

When Horatio Nelson fought the battle of Trafalgar, he used a telescope just like this to monitor the movements of the French-Spanish fleet. Our manufacturer has created a faithful replica of this famous scope. *Admiral Nelson's Telescope*™ measures about five inches in its "collapsed" position. When you extend the four sections to full length, the scope will be thirteen inches long and focused to infinity with needle sharpness. Everything will appear twenty-five times larger than it would to the naked eye. Compare that to standard binoculars which give you only 6x or 8x magnification. If you have ever wanted to own a fine telescope, but found prices a little steep, *Admiral Nelson's Telescope*™ should be your choice. You'll get many years of good use and enjoyment from it. ***Admiral Nelson's Telescope*™ #1069F870d**

Never let a dead car battery stall you again—go with...

Car Starter II™
only $49.95*

•Car Starter II™ *will keep its charge for years and will work in the most extreme hot/cold temperature conditions. Its output is an astonishing 7.5 amp-hs., incomparably higher than any competing unit. Car Starter II™ measures 8.5" x 2" x 2" and weighs only 27 oz. You should always keep one in the glove compartment of every one of your cars!*

The sickening "click-click" of a dead car battery is the most discouraging sound a motorist can hear. You are stranded—sometimes for hours or in dangerous neighborhoods—or are dependent on the kindness of strangers, who might not even have jumper cables. And you know how dangerous jumper cables (and strangers!) can be.

This can never happen to you with *Car Starter II*™, a portable power source that will charge your car battery in 15 minutes or less—just by plugging it into your cigarette lighter! After use, you can recharge the unit again right through that same cigarette lighter. And that isn't all: You can also use *Car Starter II*™ to operate any and all 12-volt appliances, such as small TV sets (up to 16 hours), portable fridges, cellular phones (up to 100 hours), camcorders, and much more.

Don't ever again worry about a dead battery and a stalled car—give convenience and safety to yourself and your loved ones and order your *Car Starter II*™ *unit(s)* today! ***CarStarter II*™ #1080F870e**

A breakthrough in audio technology...

MR-318T AM/FM/TV Stereo Personal Digital Radio™
only $69.95*

•The MR-318T *works on two AA-batteries (included). It measures only 5 x 2.5 inches and weighs less than six ounces. Fidelity is astonishing, in both loudspeaker and earphone modes! The maker of the* MR-318T *receiver is one of the world's leaders in the production of advanced radio equipment.*

There is absolutely nothing like it. This outstanding personal receiver fits in your shirtpocket or fits inconspicuously on your desk or night table. It's packed with features that give you crisp reception over the entire AM and FM bands and the audio portions of all VHF TV channels—2 to 13. Here are some of the other great features of this breakthrough personal digital radio:

- PLL Synthesized Tuning
- Built-In Speaker
- Nice-Styled Aluminum Case
- State-of-the-Art Design
- Automatic Scanning
- Headphones Included
- 25 Memory Presets: 10 AM, 10 FM, 5 TV
- FM Directional Antenna
- Batteries Included

Get "shirtpocket" AM/FM reception as you never had before. Catch the audio portion of your favorite TV show, wherever you are; watch the late TV show without disturbing your partner; listen to the commentator when you watch the ball game or any sporting event—and much more. Order it today! ***MR-318T AM/FM/TV Stereo Personal Digital Radio*™ #1074F870f**

*Our "special deal": **BUY ANY 2 ITEMS AND GET ANOTHER ONE FREE!***
For instance: Buy a $59.95 item and a $49.95 item and get another $49.95 or lesser-priced item FREE!

E56

FOR FASTEST SERVICE, ORDER BY TOLL-FREE PHONE OR BY FAX. SEE NUMBERS BELOW.

For customer service, please call (415) 643-2810. For wholesale orders, call Chris Simpson at that same number.

You may order by toll-free phone, by mail, or by fax and pay by check or Visa/MasterCard. Please give order number shown after the item. Add $4.95 shipping/insurance for your order **(except three Car Starters, three Mole-Ex VI or three Adm. Nelson's Telescopes for $9.90),** plus sales tax for CA delivery. You have 30-day return and one-year warranty. We do not refund shipping charges.

since 1967
haverhills®
2360 Third St., San Francisco, CA 94107

✆ Order by toll-free phone: (800) 797-7367 or (fastest!) by fax: (415) 643-2818 ✆
Visit our website at www.haverhills.com

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

My point isn't that Republicans' response to the Miami mob shows that on every detail of the Florida controversy they're in the wrong. On some issues—for instance, the discarding of the votes of servicemen overseas because the military often failed to postmark their ballots—they're right. The point is that they're no longer capable of reasoned distinctions. The wellspring of Republican resentment that built up over the course of the Clinton era—and that bubbled up during the government shutdown, impeachment, and the Elián González saga—has burst forth with unprecedented fury. Over the past three weeks conservatives have begun to exhibit what historian Richard Hofstadter called "the paranoid style." The Republicans may well win the presidency. But, in so doing, I think they are going insane.

ONE DEFINING CHARACTERISTIC of the paranoid style is the belief that one's enemies always act ruthlessly and in concert. Thus it has become an article of Republican faith that anyone connected in any way to the Democratic Party is inherently incapable of acting as anything other than an agent of Al Gore. From the outset, Bush's campaign has been guided by the certainty that Democratic canvassing boards would manufacture votes for Gore, and Democratic judges would manufacture law. And so the canvassing boards are deemed "grotesquely partisan" (David Tell in *The Weekly Standard*) and the Florida Supreme Court justices "demonstrable ideological partisans" (William Safire in *The New York Times*).

Yet the assumption that registered Democrats always act to further Gore's political interests just can't explain much of what has taken place in the last couple of weeks. Yes, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the right to a hand count superseded Florida's certification deadline. But it limited those hand counts to a tight, probably unachievable time frame. The Democratic canvassing board in Miami-Dade County declined to conduct the counts (perhaps in part as a result of the Miami riot), and the state Supreme Court wouldn't order it to do so. The Palm Beach board took a crucial vacation day and adopted the most constrictive standard permitted by law for determining voter intent—decisions that, taken together, may well have cost Gore the election. The Broward board, while conducting its hand count under a more liberal standard, actually produced a higher percentage of dimpled ballots for Bush than he had won in the county as a whole. If the Democratic judges and vote counters in Florida are all partisan lackeys, they're spectacularly incompetent ones.

Another feature of the paranoid style is the conviction that your side so intrinsically embodies the will of the people that any victories by your opponents are, prima facie, evidence that they have cheated. "This is not a liberal country; it is not a country predisposed to voting Democrat and liberal," the conservative talk-show host Rush Limbaugh told his listeners a week ago. "They've got to cheat in order to win big." Some Republicans have long believed that Democrats are prone to fraud. In 1992, GOP activist Grover Norquist warned that if Clinton won, he would rig the rules to win reelection, just as Democrats in Congress had before him. "They stacked the deck. They cheated. And so will a Clinton administration," he prophesied.

EMBOLDENED BY BUSH'S dark references to "mischief" in his speech after the Florida Supreme Court's ruling allowing manual recounts, this fear has in the last week seized the GOP and its intelligentsia. It does not matter that the only credible evidence of vote-tampering to date has come at the hands of Republicans in Seminole and Martin Counties. "What distinguishes the paranoid style is not, then, the absence of verifiable facts," writes Hofstadter, "but rather the curious leap in imagination that is always made at some critical point in the recital of events." Conservatives have drawn together small bits of fact—a vote-punching machine spotted on eBay, a Democratic observer accused of eating a chad—to justify their deeply ingrained fears. A *Wall Street Journal* editorial claims the paper "would not be surprised to see 1,000 Gore votes appear somewhere in the dead of night."

The most careful rendering of this particular form of illogic, however, has to be Tell's editorial in last week's *Weekly Standard*. It notes sarcastically that Florida's machine recount "by purest chance broke 80 percent in Al Gore's direction." (In fact, the machine recount added 0.0007 percent to Gore's total and 0.0002 percent to Bush's, reducing the margin by 0.0002 percent of the vote.) Based on this outcome, and without a single piece of corroborating evidence, the editorial declares: "In our bones, we're pretty sure what happened here. In the middle of the night, on November 8 . . . [the Democrats] set about, fast as lightning, before anyone was watching, doing 'anything to win.'" Tell asserts that he's also "pretty sure" the vote theft was ordered by Gore personally.

There are, needless to say, alternative explanations for Gore's gains that *are* supported by real-world evidence. For instance, hole-punch voting machines common in Democratic counties are more likely to miss votes the first time around than the more sophisticated machines found more often in Republican counties. But such evidence is essentially beside the point. When the editors of the *Standard* say they know "in our bones" that Gore tried to steal the election, they're saying that their belief in Democratic fraud can be ascertained solely by understanding the malevolence of the Democrats, without any recourse to evidence at all.

To believe something like that, you have to look upon your enemies as being not merely wrong and not merely ambitious but utterly lacking in any principles whatsoever. Conservatives have lately explained Democratic venality as a function of what George Will calls "material greed." Democrats, according to this elucidation, depend on government largesse for their livelihood and thus naturally care more about winning than self-sufficient Republicans. Cleta Mitchell, a GOP election lawyer (and former Democrat) who has launched a new career in punditry, declares that the Democratic credo is "If we don't win, we don't eat."

This theory fails every possible test of verification. Polls over the last year have consistently shown that Democratic voters have less intense preferences in the presidential race

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

than Republicans. And, at the elite level, the careerist ambitions of both campaigns' staffers are indistinguishable. Economic necessity, if anything, cuts the other way. If Gore loses, his advisers will take better-paid jobs on K Street. But these facts would suggest a moral symmetry between the two sides and are therefore dismissed. Bush, in the Republican mind, hopes to lead. Gore has—as innumerable conservatives have written—a "hunger for power."

None of this is to suggest that liberals have been the embodiment of dispassionate judgment during the Florida recount—nor that Gore has been the model of principled consistency. But there has been a real contrast in intellectual style between left and right. The organs of liberal opinion have generally labored to steer a middle path between the two candidates, resulting in evenhanded appeals to high-mindedness. Consider this typical offering from *The New York Times*: "Both [candidates] need to plan for their presidencies and also look to history for lessons in how to preserve the worthy old idea that whoever is president is president of all Americans." Or this one from *The Washington Post*: "If they are worthy of being president, the goal of both Al Gore and George W. Bush at this stage ought to be more than just winning."

But, while liberal opinion has urged Gore to take the high road, conservative opinion has demanded the opposite of Bush. A *Wall Street Journal* editorial headlined "The Squeamish GOP" laments that "Republicans are constrained by principle while Democrats are not." Almost the entire conservative press has taken up this theme, which Will calls "the ferocity gap." It is an intellectual process that justifies virtually any escalation on Bush's part as simply an effort to even the score.

In reality, Gore is the only candidate who has laid down any of the weapons at his disposal. Bush's campaign has vowed to use (in James Baker's words) "whatever remedies we may have," at one point suggesting that it would take its case simultaneously to the Florida legislature, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the House of Representatives. Gore, by contrast, has offered to extend the hand recount to Republican counties, appealed to his allies to blunt their harsher rhetoric, and forsworn efforts to flip electoral college votes on his behalf. It is quite likely, of course, that Gore has done this not out of genuine statesmanship but as a ploy to gain political advantage by seizing the moral high ground. But that's exactly the point: Gore was forced to do so because his supporters, for the most part, demand of him a level of restraint and intellectual consistency that Bush's do not.

Which is why he may lose. Among the talking heads, the prevailing wisdom for the last several years has been that fanaticism does not work as a political strategy. The lesson seemed borne out in the GOP's failures during impeachment and the government shutdown. In the current situation, commentators assured both parties that a dose of magnanimity would reap a public relations benefit outstripping any political cost. And yet Gore, who has come closest to following this advice, seems to be losing not only on the ground but also in the polls. It is comforting to believe that political reward follows from virtue. Alas, it is not always true. ■

THE NATIONAL INTEREST *Winter 2000/01*

Where Does Russia Belong? *Stephen Sestanovich*

American Sovereignty and the UN *Jesse Helms*
The Rocky Shoals of International Law *David Rivkin and Lee Casey*
Human Nature and Human Rights *Robin Fox*

China: Getting the Questions Right *Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen*
Crossing the Colombian Threshold *Brian Jenkins*

The Praetorian Guard *William Pfaff*
Nasty Little Wars *Anatol Lieven*

Also: *Fred Iklé* on the Deconstruction of Death, *John Lukacs* on the Third Reich, *Andrew Marshall* on Scoop Jackson, *John O'Sullivan* on Conor Cruise O'Brien, *James Schlesinger* on Ethnic Politics, *Adam Garfinkle* on Kosovo and Oslo, and much more.

THE NATIONAL INTEREST • P.O. Box 622 • Shrub Oak, NY 10588-0622 • (800) 893-8944 • (914) 962-6297
One year (4 issues) for $26. Please add $10 for delivery outside the U.S. and Canada. www.nationalinterest.org NR1200

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Stanley Kauffmann on Films

Profane Rites

THERE ARE STILL people who think that film should know its place. They scoff at any ambition in film toward the serious themes and the character portrayal that mark good work in other arts. Film's place, these people imply, is as a relaxation for lofty minds when they generously mix with the rabble; and its place is always—or ought to be—recognizable through a few formulas. Prime among those formulas is: Boy Meets Girl, Boy Loses Girl, Boy Gets Girl.

What a gift these sniffy folk have just been handed. **Bounce** (Miramax) is as faithfully formulaic as is possible these days. Inscribed on the screen, though invisible, are the steps of the Boy-Meets-Girl pattern, like a recipe visible on the TV screen while a chef follows it. Even more of a gift to the lofty is an insidious fact: *Bounce* is enjoyable. It could not be more predictable, but it could be a lot less pleasant.

The couple "meet cute" (a subset requirement), if "cute" can be stretched to mean anything unusual. Buddy, a slick young ad man, picks up an attractive young woman at an airport just before he is supposed to board a plane. He decides to stay over with her. He offers his ticket to Greg, whom he has just met and who is on his way home to his family. Greg accepts. The plane crashes, and everyone aboard is killed. Buddy feels that he has murdered Greg, hits the whiskey skids for a time, then decides to visit Greg's widow, Abby. She, the mother of two small boys, is struggling along as a real estate agent. Buddy hesitates to tell her about his connection with her husband's death, but he throws a big business deal her way. They fall in love. Of course she finds out his secret, resents his high-handed generosity, and throws him out. And, of course, that is not the finish.

The author-director of this stroll down a familiar path was Don Roos, whose last film, *The Opposite of Sex*, was as anti-conventional as our times allow (a high school girl seduces her gay brother's boyfriend). But Roos has now made all the righteous moves—Abby's two boys even like Buddy and vice versa—with a warm heart on his rayon sleeve. Roos knows very well that his viewers, whether low, high, or any other brow, *want* this formula, they ache for the film to permit them to like it. Roos obliges, generously dispensing access as he forges on. His dialogue has all the fabricated vim of a 1925 magazine story rewritten by the original author's great-grandson. His directing is smooth, and he is obviously sharp about actors and acting.

Gwyneth Paltrow, who is Abby, proves it. In the Paltrow films that I've seen (not all of them), she glowed when she had a good director. Her work for John Madden in *Shakespeare in Love* was prime. Lesser directors seem almost to reduce her, as in *Emma*. Here Roos has helped Paltrow to find some unforeseen truths in this predictable character. One of the best of them is the moment when Abby learns of Greg's death, which Roos cunningly shoots in middle distance, unheard in the airport bustle.

Ben Affleck, too, did well in *Shakespeare in Love*. Here, as Buddy, he sheds the patina of a young actor headed for stardom and presents a man shaken by the immensity of the situation into which he has stumbled, a situation that alters but doesn't get easier.

Basically, however, what keeps us interested in a picture of this kind is the boy-girl sizzle. Without some savor in their relationship, when the sparks don't fly, the formula oppresses. Here there are sparks aplenty, so, even though we know in advance that Affleck and Paltrow are going to get together, we want it to happen and we feel good when it does happen. We can almost hear ourselves conceding thanks to the formula itself for the fun.

Still, especially because it is effective, *Bounce* leaves us feeling oddly enlisted, members of an obedient corps. For a hundred years, millions of people around the globe have been flocking to films whose basic shape any one of them could predict. Huddled masses yearning to breathe unfree, yearning to be dragooned once again, they accept new character names for familiar characters, small shifts of locale and plot, as trinkets of justification, they chuckle and sigh and regret and beam on cue. I certainly include myself among these submissive creatures—when the formula is competently filled. But what is it that makes us accept it?

Perhaps it is the formula's reliability, its certitude in a world of uncertainty. Risking sacrilege, I venture that there is here some parallel in form with the rites of organized religions. When a religionist of any kind in any place on the globe enters his place of worship and follows its rituals, he knows that millions of others around the world, some of them at that very moment, respond exactly as he does. As writers on religion have often noted, the very form of religion itself, apart from its content, is a solace, a surety.

I might add that this doesn't make *Bounce* a fount of commonalty for mankind, a global unifier of the spirit, but I won't. For small favors, even picayune secular ones, some thanks are in order. Film formulas were not invented, they were extracted—from previous arts such as the popular theater and from insight into social needs. *Bounce* is the latest solace that, at least briefly, binds us all together.

Book Note. The British Film Institute has published *The BFI Companion to Eastern European and Russian Cinema*, edited by Richard Taylor, Nancy Wood, Julian Graffy and Dina Iordonova, all of whom are professors in Britain of subjects related to this book (Indiana University Press, 288 pp., hardbound $65, paperbound $29.95). One of the longest entries, naturally, is on Soviet film and was written by Taylor, a known expert on Eisenstein. Taylor concludes:

> If Soviet cinema has by now disappeared, Russian cinema is in danger of following in its footsteps in the looming chaos of transition to shadowy notions of capitalism and democracy. A seminal chapter in the history of European and world cinema has come to an end.

This elegiac shadow hangs over the whole book, hardly in mourning for the demise of communism but, particularized though it is, for the demise of the illusions about communism that produced some of the most vigorous and imaginative films in history. No one could wish to go through those illusions again; no one could regret that at least they produced these films.

The number of current imports from Eastern Europe are not a reliable index of conditions there because all foreign

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

imports have dwindled, but this book conveys what Polish and Hungarian friends have told me about the swollen difficulties of film production in their countries. Still, this small encyclopedia pays plenty of attention to younger generations in the countries discussed, and it affirms that fresh talents are struggling to flourish.

It would be a violation of critical protocol if a few flaws were not noted. The entry on the Mezhrabpom film studio doesn't mention where it is located. Why is Erich Korngold included? He did all his film composing in the West. The only entry on comedy is *Comedy: Poland*, as if Czech, Hungarian, Yugoslavian, and even Soviet comedy didn't exist. Despite these and a few other glitches that were noticed en route, this *Companion* will prove very companionable. It is much more than a requiem, but even if it were only a compact history of the high days, it would be welcome. ■

Robert Brustein on Theater

Deconstructing Susan

SUSAN SONTAG'S PLAY **Alice in Bed** has enjoyed at least three productions in recent years, its appeal lying less in any intrinsic qualities as a dramatic work than in the way it functions as a kind of theatrical *tabula rasa*. The play is an instrument on which gifted musicians may play whatever music they please. Sontag's writing here has an almost porous quality, its terse, disjunctive style absorbing subtextual interpolations like a sponge. This quality, along with the author's willingness to allow her collaborators the widest latitude, may explain why the work has attracted some of the world's most adventurous experimental directors. Robert Wilson gave *Alice in Bed* a workshop production in Germany some years ago. Bob McGrath staged its world premiere at my own theater in Cambridge in 1996. And now Ivo van Hove is presenting it to New York audiences at the New York Theater Workshop. Each production has revealed an entirely different play. Sontag may have written the ultimate postmodernist work, not only open to deconstruction by outside interpreters but also deconstructing itself.

On the page, *Alice in Bed* has some of the itinerant qualities of a *nouvelle vague* novel. Essentially a monologue, it is composed of the daydreams of Alice James, the younger sister of William and Henry, living in London and confined to her bed by a combination of physical and neurasthenic complaints. Although she mostly talks to herself, Alice also has some hallucinatory dialogues with members of her celebrated family, as well as joining in conversation with a trio of ghosts during an imaginary tea party inspired by *Alice in Wonderland*. Alice's invited guests include the transcendentalist bluestocking Margaret Fuller, the great reclusive poet Emily Dickinson, and Kundry, the wandering seductress of Wagner's *Parsifal*. This array of historical and fictional female celebrities sometimes makes the play look like an avant-garde version of *Top Girls*. But no single style is allowed to dominate the evening. In a surprisingly conventional final scene, Sontag abruptly shifts gears and starts writing in the manner of a Victorian drawing-room comedy. It is an episode that recalls the sickbed scene in Shaw's *Too True to Be Good*, featuring an incompetent burglar who surprises Alice, then delights her so much that she actually manages to rise from her bed of pain.

Sontag's purpose, in these brief and impressionistic vignettes, is to celebrate the unsung qualities of an unusual woman who may have been the most brilliant of all the elder James's "brilliant, talkative children." An invalid desperate for attention, Alice finds little comfort in conversations with her brother Henry, and less with her father, Henry Sr. "Aren't you impressed, father, by how unhappy I am?" she asks. "Make an effort," he replies. "May I kill myself?" she inquires. "You must do what you want," he responds. Eventually she dies, though not as a result of suicide, at the age of forty-three. Possibly she was chilled to death.

If each production of *Alice in Bed* reveals a different side of the play, the current one also reveals a different side of Ivo van Hove, the redoubtable Dutch theater artist who is currently general manager and resident director of one of Holland's most daring theater ensembles, Het Zuidelijk Toneel. Thanks to invitations by James C. Nicola, the artistic director of the New York Theater Workshop, van Hove has been arousing American audiences in recent seasons with his audacious reinterpretations of American drama, beginning with Eugene O'Neill's *More Stately Mansions*, followed by Tennessee Williams's *A Streetcar Named Desire* and now Sontag's *Alice in Bed*. Each of these productions has been created in collaboration with van Hove's imaginative designer Jan Versweyveld, who is managing to invent entirely unexpected, and at the same time curiously inevitable, environments for works that have hitherto been frozen in realism.

Van Hove and Versweyveld reduced the cluttered New Orleans tenement of *Streetcar* to one isolated bathtub. The fashionable London flat of *Alice in Bed* has been transformed into an abstract collage of found objects hanging by strings above Alice's bed. The bed itself is a metal construction that looks like a medieval torture machine. But all the junk hanging from the flies looks suitable for torture—a mirror, a comb, a teapot, a syringe, and other props referred to in the course of the play. Actually, though, the major design element is not solid stage material at all. It is a series of diaphanous surfaces that are raised and lowered, or pulled around the bed like a curtain, to function as a screen for still projections and moving pictures. The result is a dazzling display of visual images as powerful and adroit as any to be seen on the contemporary stage.

Alice begins the play in furious debate with herself, alternately using the guttural tones of a grown woman and the squeaky shrieks of a little girl. In the powerful virtuoso performance of Joan Macintosh, the woman is a frenetic force of nature, a tornado confined in an egg shell. When talking to her father (played by Jeroen Krabbe), she is communicating with an image on a screen, whose face keeps morphing into that of her mother (sometimes played by Macintosh herself, sometimes by Valda Setterfield). The film is slowed and stopped, the dialogue falling purposely out of sync with the lips that are speaking it. The screen images

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

chase each other around the stage. Alice chases the images. Sometimes Alice observes herself on the screen. Sometimes she converses with a life-size image of herself, a quasi-hologram. The images split, divide, and multiply, like the characters in Strindberg's *Dream Play*. The ghost tea party (reminiscent of the Ghost Supper in another Strindberg play, *The Ghost Sonata*) is also a filmed sequence in which Alice wanders around the cinematic action and sometimes into it. At the end, Alice is back in stage reality, still torn by a fatal ambivalence, arguing with her younger self: "Let me fall asleep. Let me get up." A child's voice is heard, speaking in German, gently saying "*Schlaf*."

On the page, *Alice in Bed* looks slight and underwritten, meandering, even a little precious. On the stage, it is an engrossing and sometimes moving experience. In demonstrating how a minor work of literature can provide the occasion for a major piece of theater, this production redeems the value of the collaborative arts.

Oliver Py's **Requiem for Srebrenica**, which recently played at BAM's Harvey Theater in Brooklyn, is an attempt to create a theatrical documentary out of the 1995 massacre of 7,000 Bosnian Muslims by the invading Serbian army. The thirty-five-year-old Py is a French playwright and director who, aside from occasionally performing in drag cabarets, heads the Centre Dramatique National in Orléans. I understand that he is emerging as a major force in French theater. I am sure he has better pieces in his repertory than *Requiem for Srebenica*.

I suppose that it is callous to apply aesthetic standards to works driven by political passions, and especially to such a ghastly event as the Srebenica massacre. But that may be the basic fault of Py's piece. It is such a relentlessly single-minded indictment of everything and everybody—of the Serbs, and the U.N. forces that stood idly by while the atrocities were taking place, and the indifferent French authorities, and perhaps the passive audiences listening to the play—that it ultimately fails in the one area a work of propaganda is required to succeed. Instead of stirring the spectator's indignation to some kind of action, it manages only to stimulate our guilt, which may why we end up judging the show more severely than the atrocity.

Occasionally there are effective theatrical resources employed in *Requiem for Srebrenica*. The account of the events is spoken by three women (Anne Bellec, Irina Dalle, and Frédérique Ruchaud) because all the men in Srebrenica have been slaughtered. The actresses are strong performers, but what they are delivering is essentially a flat stage lecture documented with statistics of horrors, calamities, and mutilations. At one point, a metal wheelbarrow is pulled up the flies by a rope, as we hear an account of how the Bosnians tried to hang themselves. A stage image like that is worth a thousand words. Unfortunately, it is drowned out by considerably more than a thousand words.

There is no doubt that events transpired at Srebrenica pretty much as this play describes them, and none of us liberal theatergoers doubts that the Serbian commanders responsible for the massacres should be tried and punished for war crimes. Although most of us came to the theater with that belief, it is the one truth that we hear repeated during the hour and a half that the evening lasts. But it is the design of drama, it is its very essence, to accommodate a multitude of truths—which is why a play proceeds through dialogues and not through monologues. Perhaps there are some subjects that are too monolithic for theater to accommodate. Judging from *Requiem for Srebrenica*, the Bosnian conflict may be one of them. ■

When Palestine first exploded.

Eyeless in Zion

By ANITA SHAPIRA

I.

TOM SEGEV IS one of Israel's most prominent and most controversial journalists. Gifted with a sharp eye and a barbed tongue, he presents himself as the ironic, even cynical critic of Israeli reality. Nothing is spared the whetted edge of his sarcasm. Recently Segev managed to outrage many Israelis when, with Olympian calm, he asserted on a television talk show that Deborah Lipstadt's victory in court over David Irving was insignificant: Holocaust denial, Segev proclaimed, is entirely a marginal matter, and does not merit the media exposure that it receives. Never mind that an entire conference devoted to Holocaust denial was held not long ago in Amman, where it was treated as a legitimate scholarly topic.

Segev chooses to see what he wants to see. His column in *Ha'aretz*, called "Foreign Correspondent" in the Hebrew edition, is called "Eye of the Beholder" in the paper's English-language edition. Both titles express Segev's own sense of himself: though he is an Israeli by birth and by dint of his cultural roots, he prefers to regard himself as a detached observer not implicated by the local ethos, an outsider who can supposedly see all the society's failings. His stance is reminiscent of the "wicked son" in the Passover Haggadah, who asks: "What is this service to you?" The text comments: "He says 'to you,' but not to him. By thus excluding himself from the community, he has denied what is fundamental."

Segev holds a doctorate in German history, which he earned with a dissertation on Nazi concentration camp commanders. His remarkable gifts as a writer are evident not only in his column, but also in several books that have enjoyed great popularity in Israel while also provoking strong criticism. The same qualities that make Segev's writing as a journalist so fascinating—his penchant for sweeping statements and unexpected perspectives, his desire to stun his readers—make his forays into historiography arguable in the extreme. He certainly knows how to write a riveting tale; but it is doubtful whether the story that Segev tells meets the rules and the conventions of genuine historical inquiry.

ONE PALESTINE, COMPLETE:
JEWS AND ARABS UNDER
THE BRITISH MANDATE
by Tom Segev
(Metropolitan Books, 612 pp., $35)

Segev's first book, *1949, The First Israelis*, which appeared in English in 1986, presented an often original portrait of the hardships of the new immigrants in the fledgling state of Israel, and also of the ordeal of its Arab population in the state's first year. But there was a minor omission in Segev's book: all those Israelis who were in Palestine before 1948, the men and the women who established the state and fought in the War of Indepen-

ANITA SHAPIRA, the Ruben Merenfeld Professor of the Study of Zionism at Tel Aviv University, is the author of *Land and Power: The Zionist Resort to Force, 1881-1948* (Stanford University Press).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dence. Segev's next venture, *The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust*, which was published in English in 1993, explored the attitudes of the Zionist movement toward the Holocaust, insinuating that perhaps the movement could have done more—or then again, maybe not. The ambiguous formulation infuriated readers, who interpreted it as an unforgivable innuendo on a matter of the utmost sensitivity.

And here is Segev's new book, *One Palestine, Complete*, which tells the story of the British Mandate in Palestine. Segev's book is neither anti-Zionist nor pro-Arab. Both sides will find a great deal here to anger them. Nor is Segev a "new historian," even if he is a provocateur. He is wary of moralistic pathos and he does not run with any pack. He loves to infuriate readers, but he does not offer them any particular view of the world. Segev's perspective remains cool and detached, as he regards with a spectator's eye the Middle Eastern version of the human comedy. In his new book, Segev again presents a mixture of arresting and even original chapters intermingled with far-fetched assertions, unsubstantiated statements, and occasionally a rather idiosyncratic interpretation of sources. And again one must wonder about his selectivity—what is included, what is left out, and his criteria for doing so.

II.

THE BRITISH RULED in Palestine for some thirty years, first by force of conquest, beginning with their victory over the Ottoman Turks when Allenby captured Jerusalem in December, 1917, and then by the authority of the League of Nations mandate. When the British arrived in Palestine, there were some 650,000 Arabs and 56,000 Jews in the land. When they departed in May 1948, there were about one million Arabs and 600,000 Jews. On their arrival, they were welcomed by Jews and Arabs alike as redeemers. On their departure, both sides accused them of treachery and betrayal. Behind them they left a land at war. From that turmoil, the state of Israel emerged victorious. The Palestinians experienced the trauma of defeat, flight, and expulsion; and most of them were ultimately annexed into the Kingdom of Jordan. Segev examines these huge transformations within such a short span of time, interpreting them through the detached prism of his "foreign correspondent's" eye.

The historiography of the Mandate period in Palestine has always been a highly charged topic. Dominant in England was the pan-Arab school, which Elie Kedourie called "The Chatham House Version" (after the Royal Institute of International Affairs, headed by Arnold Toynbee and located in Chatham House in London). This version depicted the relations between Britain and the Arabs as a moralistic tale of sin, guilt, and retribution: the British failed to fulfill the promises made to the Arabs, because they fell victim to Zionist propaganda and Jewish pressures. They took upon themselves the obligation of the Balfour Declaration to assist in the establishment of a "Jewish National Home" in Palestine, and so they ultimately forfeited their influence in the Middle East. Elizabeth Monroe, one of the outstanding historians of this school, concluded: "Measured by British interests alone, it was one of the greatest mistakes in our imperial history."

The Zionist version of Mandate history, the version popular in the first two decades after Israeli independence, was likewise a moralistic tale. In this account, the British promised the Zionists that they would establish a "National Home" in Palestine in recognition of shared British-Jewish interests, but subsequently the British capitulated to Arab violence, thereby reneging on their commitments. As a result, they lost Palestine. Among Jews in the *Yishuv* who reached adulthood in the Mandate's final decade, the widespread view was that "perfidious Albion" was the great enemy of the Jewish people. Some even went so far as to compare the British to the Nazis. The War of Independence in 1948 was seen by Jewish combatants as a "war of liberation" against British imperialism. And even after the emergence of the state, its leaders feared that the British, by one subterfuge or another, might attempt to re-establish their rule in Palestine. The demonization of the British and their role in Palestine was a canonical element of the popular narrative of the state's birth.

As events receded in time, the intense emotions that had accompanied the traumas of the 1940s faded, and Israel gained a recognized and respected place in the international arena, the archives of Britain and Israel were gradually opened. One result of all these changes was the emergence of a more complicated historical picture, a mosaic of interests and images, correct and incorrect, that had affected the formation of British policy on Palestine. For example, the popular myth that the British had issued the Balfour Declaration as a reward for Chaim Weizmann's contribution to the British war effort (the invention of synthetic acetone) was relegated to the vaults of legend. The Balfour Declaration came to be interpreted in the context of the British attempts to rid themselves of the restrictions imposed by

Winner of the 1999 Pulitzer Prize for History
Now available in paperback!

"Exceptionally readable...a spectacle, a cavalcade."
—The New Yorker

Burrows and Wallace offer a large-canvas portrait of a city they clearly love."
—The New York Times Book Review

"The most comprehensive examination to date of the city's history."—The Atlantic Monthly

"A masterwork."—The Baltimore Sun

"A lavish and dazzling banquet."—The Economist



OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

At bookstores everywhere. 1424 pp.; 204 illus. and maps $24.95

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which they concluded with France in 1916, concerning the precise manner in which the Middle East would be carved up after victory. According to that agreement, much of Palestine was to come under international control, while the area to the north was to be allocated to the French. British support for Zionism was one of the means used to justify the consignment of Palestine. Its geopolitical position, after all, was of great strategic significance for the Empire, guarding the land routes to the East and the defense of the Suez Canal astride Britain's vital sea route to India.

CENTRAL ZIONIST ARCHIVE

Arab soldiers in the service of the British in Palestine, 1939

As Segev would have it, however, the British were nothing less than the central factor to which the Jewish state owed its existence. Such a view is useful, insofar as it helps to retire the myth that portrayed the Mandate as a black period in the *Yishuv's* history, and the "devious British" as the sworn enemies of the Jewish people. The Mandate period was, in fact, a crucial stage in the formation of a critical Jewish mass in Palestine, a social and institutional concentration that enabled the creation of Israel in 1948. The protective canopy of an enlightened state such as Great Britain over Palestine resembled the "charter" of which Herzl had dreamed, an imperial arrangement that would create the necessary conditions for the establishment of the Jewish state.

Segev is not the first Israeli historian to deal realistically and dispassionately with the Mandate period, and his widely read book has helped to popularize this more sober approach. As usual, however, Segev goes too far. He does not just correct the mistaken perception in Israeli collective memory regarding the British. He goes out of his way to cast the British as genuinely pro-Zionist. He concedes, of course, that there were many anti-Semites in the British ranks; and almost every quotation that he adduces from officials in the Mandate administration bemoans the injustices toward the Arabs being perpetrated by the British. Yet this does not deter Segev from asserting that the British favored Zionism—more, that they actually established the Jewish state.

Segev cannot find any strong strategic or political reasons for British involvement in Palestine. Indeed, he quotes assertions by a number of military officers to the effect that Palestine was of marginal importance to the Empire. And so, proceeding from this rather opaque basis, Segev constructs a fanciful explanation as to why the British issued the Balfour Declaration and even incorporated it into the text of the League of Nations Mandate. They did so, he claims, because they were convinced that the Jews wielded enormous international power. Which is to say, the British aided the Zionists because they believed *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. Segev admits that emotional factors, such as the influence of the Bible, also shaped the thinking of figures such as Lloyd George; but he contends that the decisive factor was their estimation of the power and the influence that Jews supposedly exercised throughout the world—a conspiratorial and essentially anti-Semitic view.

There is a kernel of truth here—but only a kernel. For the deliberations surrounding the Balfour Declaration reveal a complex array of long-term strategic factors, such as Britain's desire to break the agreement with France on shared sovereignty over Palestine, and short-term aims, such as Britain's interest in securing the support of American Jewry for Washington's entry into World War I. The Jews loathed the czarist regime in Russia and its policies of anti-Jewish persecution, and supported the Germans, whose record in treating Jews was comparatively fair. There were fears that the Germans might issue a pro-Zionist declaration of their own. The German and Irish minorities in the United States opposed American entry into the war, so garnering the support of the large Jewish minority there for the cause of the Great Powers took on added importance. After the democratic revolution in Russia in the spring of 1917, the British hoped that Russian Jews, many of them strongly pro-Zionist, would strengthen the hand of the Kerensky government, which favored continued Russian involvement in the war. The Bolsheviks, by contrast, were calling for an abandonment of the war effort. The British hope proved illusory, though the Russian Zionists were not to blame.

Segev's thesis that a fantasy of "Jewish global power" motivated British support for Zionism gives rise to an intriguing paradox, especially if one recalls Herzl's assertion that anti-Semites could be persuaded to help Zionism. Yet Herzl's reasoning was based on the wish widespread among anti-Semites to be rid of European Jewry, not on a fantastic notion of the "power of world Jewry." Segev's claim here provides a new perspective on an old puzzle: why did British politicians take the leaders of an ephemeral national movement such as Zionism as seriously as they did? After all, many such movements frequented the drawing rooms of the Great Powers, awaiting the opportune moment at the war's end when the maps would be redrawn and the world reapportioned anew. But Segev offers no explanation as to why the British continued to adhere to the Balfour Declaration even *after* they had conquered Palestine and been granted the coveted Mandate from the League of Nations. At the high tide of empire, the United Kingdom was the greatest Great Power in the world: it really is doubtful that the British lion was daunted by the myth of Jewish power. Actually, the main British objective in their adherence to the Balfour Declaration was to justify British rule in Palestine within the framework of the international commitments that it had already undertaken.

Segev's introduction refers to the Balfour Declaration with a well-known cliché: "The promised land had, by the stroke of a pen, become twice-promised."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

He appears to believe, with the Chatham House scholars, that Palestine had also been promised to the Arabs. But Segev does not accept the Arab argument that Palestine had been promised to the Arabs in 1915 in recompense for their revolt against the Ottoman Empire, a pledge allegedly contained in a letter written by the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, to King Hussein, the Sharif of Mecca. Did Palestine figure here as part of some political commitment? Segev writes: "Apparently it did not, but the letter's wording is vague, perhaps deliberately so, either to mislead the Arabs or out of carelessness."

So what exactly does Segev believe? This is a fine example of the elusiveness that pervades his work. The reasons that he offers for the vagueness in the McMahon letter run from carelessness all the way to criminal intent; and the reader is left to decide which is the more plausible explanation. And yet Segev's presentation is not exactly ambivalent. The statement about "twice-promised" Palestine creates a sense of British "original sin" and subsequent injustice to the Arabs. From the very beginning of Segev's narrative, the reader is prepared to sympathize with the allegedly injured party.

III.

One of the attractions of Segev's book is his skillful use of individual human stories to plot the line of his narrative. He begins with the tale of a Jew named Alter Levine. Levine seeks refuge in the house of an Arab named Khalil al-Sakakini, during the final days of the Turkish regime. Al-Sakakini takes the Jew in, but in the end the Turks seize both men and transport them together in chains to a prison in Damascus. Set free after several months, they go their separate ways. Al-Sakakini became a prominent figure in the Palestinian national movement, an educator and an orator on Arab nationalism, a leading Jerusalem intellectual. In the war of 1948, he fled his home in the Katamon quarter of the city, never to return. Levine became a successful insurance agent in Jerusalem, and a man with literary pretensions; the poems that he published in the Hebrew press are cited by Segev in all their mediocrity. In 1933, a despondent Levine took his own life.

Levine is supplanted in the Zionist thread of Segev's narrative by a young immigrant from Lithuania named Yefim Gordin, who later changes his name to Halevi. After great difficulties, Gordin manages to enroll at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Segev documents his path as it leads Halevi further and further to the right. In the book's final section, we meet the figure of Yaakov Cohen, a young sabra and member of the Palmach; and Segev contrasts him with Sari al-Sakakini, Khalil's son who was educated in the United States, and returns home as the Mandate nears its end.

Segev recounts these biographies to underscore the existential inescapability of the Arab-Israeli dispute, a view that I share. Sakakini and Levine are depicted as symbolic figures. Sakakini is a Christian, enamored of Western culture, a lover of Beethoven. Levine is a more private person, involved neither politically nor culturally in the central events in the *Yishuv* in the Mandate years. Sakakini is the more interesting figure, and he certainly plays a more central role in his own national movement. But both of Segev's exemplary figures oscillate between tradition and modernism, and both admire American civilization. One may wonder whether they are really representative of their communities. I suspect not.

Historians are often influenced in their inquiry by the materials available. The diaries of Sakakini and Levine and their other writings were an appealing basis for an engaging narrative, especially in light of the dramatic encounter between the two men. Yet Segev's choice of protagonists has a disconcerting result. The Arab national movement is represented by an intellectual, a comparatively enlightened and progressive man, with whom we can identify. The representative figure for the Jewish national movement, by contrast, is a petit bourgeois with certain intellectual and artistic airs, eager to turn a profit, who meets a tragic end. And after Levine's tale reaches its sad climax, his proxy Halevi is hardly someone whom the reader can respect and admire. We may empathize with Halevi's struggle to secure an economic foothold, so as to bring his family to Palestine; but his increasing involvement with esoteric and extreme right-wing Jewish organizations is pathetic. As for the young Palmach member Yaakov Cohen, he writes innocently about his dedication to the homeland and his readiness to sacrifice his life for it (Segev describes his declarations as "patriotic platitudes"); and eventually we learn of his death in 1948, in the legendary and desperate battle that was waged by the thirty-five combatants sent as reinforcements to the Etzyon Bloc, who all perished. Not a single Jewish figure in Segev's book, then, is portrayed as appealingly as al-Sakakini.

The third side in the Palestinian triangle, of course, was Britain. Segev oscillates between two approaches. On the one hand, he tries to show that the British were pro-Zionist. In his account, it is

American Education



AN ELUSIVE SCIENCE
The Troubling History of Education Research
Ellen Condliffe Lagemann
"In this candid and incisive study, [Lagemann] examines how Americans perceive the people who practice education and explains why their low-status work has undermined the possibilities for developing a strong professional community and generative scholarly tradition. . . . A stark yet enlightening look at American education, research methodologies, and federal government funding agencies and their practices."—*Library Journal*
Cloth $25.00

PARENTS AND SCHOOLS
The 150-Year Struggle for Control in American Education
William W. Cutler, III
"Historian and school director Cutler has examined PTA minutes and local publications from the mid-19th century to the present to write an intimate history of the ambiguous and symbiotic relationship between home and school."
—*Publishers Weekly*
Cloth $25.00

Available in bookstores.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
www.press.uchicago.edu

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they who actually establish the Jewish National Home. On the other hand, he is eager to demonstrate that from the very outset the British sensed that they had made a bad bargain. To bolster his argument, he adduces quotations that suggest the British supported the Zionist enterprise and treated the Arabs poorly—and yet simultaneously hated the Jews, and were convinced that the policy of a National Home was fundamentally flawed. The resulting picture tilts in favor of the second, "bad bargain" approach.

SEGEV DESCRIBES ANY British official even slightly sympathetic to Jewish aspirations in Palestine—or at least not hostile to them—as a "Zionist." Ronald Storrs, the governor of Jerusalem, whose behavior during the riots in Jerusalem in 1920 was, as Segev sees it, marked by arrogance and criminal negligence, is still categorized by him as a Zionist. Why? Because Storrs's later published memoirs did not contain the kind of anti-Zionist views that Jews accused him of harboring during his tenure as governor. Arthur Wauchope, the High Commissioner for Palestine in the 1930s—in Ben-Gurion's assessment, "the best of the commissioners"—was also a "Zionist," since he openly expressed his sympathies for the Zionist cause, and permitted massive Jewish immigration, and allowed Jewish capital to be transferred into Palestine. But that was not all there was to Wauchope. If one considers also that he sought to create a 40:60 "balance" between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, and endeavored to promote the concept of a shared "Palestinian personality," the thesis that Wauchope was at heart a Zionist lacks credibility.

There were two Englishmen in the Palestine administration who *were* true-blue Zionists. Richard Meinertzhagen and Orde Wingate were both outstanding military men, and lovers of the Bible, and staunch supporters of the Zionist cause. Significantly, in Segev's account, these two figures emerge as unhinged, tottering on the brink of madness. By contrast, most of the British administration officials, educators, soldiers, and officers whom Segev cites repeatedly give voice to their amazement and their anger over the policy of the Jewish National Home that the British government is forcing them to pursue, and which they view as a grievous mistake because it was a policy that discriminated against the Arabs. They wonder why they need the whole Pandora's box called Palestine. This attitude, however, Segev categorizes not as pro-Arab but as pro-British. In his view, these officials liked both sides very little. This is basically correct, except that on balance they liked the Jews even less.

CHAIM ARLOSOROFF, THE gifted head of the political department of the Jewish Agency in the early 1930s, cogently outlined the origins of this prevailing British attitude. Every British official or British soldier who comes to Palestine, Arlosoroff explained, even if he was politically ingenuous on arrival, fell immediately under the influence of the prevailing political and demographic reality: few Jews, many Arabs. The demands to change the status quo were raised by the Jewish side, while the British were inclined toward its maintenance. Moreover, the Jews tended to be insistent and discourteous, failing to show administrative officials the proper respect. And so, in Arlosoroff's telling, even those British who started out neutral in Palestine ended up pro-Arab.

Yet Segev disregards Jewish sources, including Arlosoroff, in his discussion of this question. More, he himself provides the evidence for the British preference for the Arabs, in a detailed portrait of high society in Jerusalem during the Mandate. That milieu was one in which Arabs and Britons came together to converse and to dance, to eat and to drink, to make love and to gossip. Jews were not privy to this closed world, this class-based colonial circuit. The mutual affection and warmth that animated the Jerusalem salons reflected precisely where British sympathies really lay in the struggle between the two national communities in Palestine. It is no accident that Segev depicts Wauchope as a man hated by his salon-frequenting subordinates: he had remained unaffected by the romanticism of the Orient. Yet Wauchope was an exception.

Segev repeatedly tries to create a kind of symmetry between Arabs and Jews. He compares Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the mufti of Jerusalem, with David Ben-Gurion. The mufti, Segev argues, deployed Islam in order to mobilize international support for Arab nationalism; and Ben-Gurion made use of socialism to advance the Zionist agenda. Hajj Amin promoted the position of Jerusalem over the position of Damascus within the Arab national movement; and Ben-Gurion promoted Tel Aviv over London in the world Zionist arena. Each man was bolstered by British support. Both encouraged an aggressive nationalism, while remaining within the bounds of what the British were willing to tolerate. Both became national symbols and led their peoples toward war.

Yet what symmetry was there, really, between Husseini's radical Islamic agitation and the socialist ideals of Ben-Gurion and his comrades? How can turning Jerusalem into a center of world Islam be equated with augmenting the influence of the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem over its London branch? (And why does Segev mention Tel Aviv in this connection, when the Jewish national institutions were located in Jerusalem?) In the 1930s, Ben-Gurion sought out a dialogue with the Arabs; but Husseini was never prepared for any kind of talks with the Jews. The British administration did indeed appoint the mufti—but they did nothing to enhance Ben-Gurion's position and status. Ben-Gurion led his people to victory, Hajj Amin led his people to disaster. By Segev's comparative method, it would be possible to make analogies between Hitler and Roosevelt: both rose to power in the wake of the Great Depression; both espoused an ideology (Nazism, the New Deal); both had numerous admirers; both strengthened the national identity of their respective nations; both led their people to war; and so on.

One British practice that infuriated the Jews in Palestine was their tendency to depict anti-Jewish Arab violence as a "war between two peoples"—as a confrontation in which Jews and Arabs were ipso facto equivalent, and both culpable. (This old British habit brings to mind the media reaction to the current Palestinian riots.) Ideologically, the British explained this response by arguing that the Zionists' very presence in Palestine constituted a provocation for the Arab majority population. In practice, they sought to highlight each and every instance of anti-Arab Jewish violence during the disturbances, even if the violence was undertaken in self-defense. It is certainly true that incidents did occur in which Jews took revenge on Arabs. Still, there is a huge difference between isolated incidents of Jewish savagery and the numerous acts of murder, rape, and destruction committed against Jews by Arab rioters. In the spirit of the British, however, Segev attempts to strike a "balance." In doing so, he stresses every Jewish act of revenge against Arabs, at times even relying solely on Arab testimony, without additional confirmation from other sources.

THE SUMMER OF 1929 witnessed a wave of violent disturbances unprecedented in Palestine in their fury and their scope. The trouble erupted at the Western Wall in Jerusalem in August and spread like wildfire throughout the land. In the collective Jewish memory, those riots are remembered for the massacre of Jews in Hebron. Segev suggests a complex of reasons behind the bloodbath that was perpetrated by Arabs against the Jews in the town: anxiety about the fate of Islamic holy places; fear of the Zionists; xenophobia; hatred of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Jewish merchants and money lenders; and just plain bloodlust. Characteristically, he gives equal space to comments on the isolated incidents in which, according to the Jewish Agency Executive, Jews shamefully exceeded the limits of self-defense. He correctly points out that the majority of the Jews in Hebron were saved by Arabs who took them in, sometimes at risk to their own lives. But there is much that Segev fails to mention: for example, that the newspaper *Davar* published a special column at the time on Arab assistance to endangered Jews, entitled "Lights in the Darkness," in order to dampen anti-Arab feelings of hatred within the Jewish community that might erupt in senseless acts of revenge.

Segev cites the terrible statistics of the disturbances—133 Jews dead, 116 Arabs dead—but he fails to note that most of the Arabs who died were not killed by Jews. They were killed by the British police. And in describing the attitude of the British judges to the Jews and the Arabs accused of terror, Segev claims that the British demonstrated greater leniency toward Jewish defendants. He does not try to weigh Jewish guilt and Arab guilt, but instead he presents statistics on hangings and extended detention to prove his point about British "partiality" to the Jews. It does not occur to him that the number of Jews sentenced to the gallows was small for a good reason: they did not deserve the death penalty.

On the eve of the disturbances in August 1929, there was a wave of Arab agitation accusing the Jews of plotting to take control of the Temple Mount, to destroy the mosques there, and to rebuild the ancient Temple. (It is an allegation with a disturbingly familiar ring these days.) This religious agitation was directed by the mufti not least to further his own ambitions within the Arab world, and it was one of the factors that sparked the eruption of violence. But again Segev seeks to strike a balance, or at least to provide a rational explanation for the agitation. He suggests that though the Jews did not intend to seize control of the Temple Mount, there was nonetheless a postcard distributed in the United States by Zionist groups that could be interpreted as reflecting such a plan. After the disturbances, the postcard was submitted by the Arabs as proof of their allegations.

After providing the reader another half-page of such "evidence" to put the blame for the agitation on the Zionists, Segev concludes that "altogether, these expressions provided a foundation for the popular Arab belief in the Jewish threat. The fear was authentic and the mufti exploited it. He played with a smoldering fire that suddenly flared into a great conflagration. Zionist politics had a very similar dynamic." The last sentence is puzzling. When, precisely, did the Zionist leadership exploit religious fears in order to instigate violence? To be sure, there were radicals on the fringes of the Zionist camp who did their best to provoke hatred, but such agitation was a far cry from mainstream Zionist policy. No Zionist leader comparable in status to the mufti of Jerusalem ever considered "playing with fire."

But Segev is inveterate in his liking for parallels, and he closes here with a reference to Jabotinsky, the leader of the Zionist right, and how he allegedly exploited the disturbances to attract supporters: "The wall affair was good for him, just as it was good for the mufti." And the analogies continue. Segev compares Iz-al-Din al-Qassam, the Muslim zealot from Haifa (and the shining hero of Hamas today), who was responsible for the ambush and the murder of Jewish wayfarers, with Joseph Trumpeldor, who died in a skirmish between Jews and Arabs in 1920 at Tel Hai, a small Jewish settlement in the far north of Palestine. In Segev's view, they were two national heroes who both died for the sake of the homeland.

In 1935, Ben-Gurion commented on the stand against the British security forces by the band of fighters led by al-Qassam in November 1935 near Ya'bad, when they were trapped by police and wiped out, by describing it as the "Arab Tel Hai." Tel Hai had become symbolic, for Jews, of a heroic last stand; and Ben-Gurion was suggesting that the confrontation at Ya'bad had laid the foundation for an Arab myth of valor, glorifying the heroic readiness to fight to the death if necessary. It was a noble point, and a limited point; but Segev proceeds to build an entire thesis regarding the similarities between Trumpeldor and al-Qassam, rather like his crude and embarrassing analogy between Ben-Gurion and the mufti: both Trumpeldor and al-Qassam were immigrants with military experience; both had a group of admirers; both became legends after their violent deaths; the one blended nationalism with Marxism, the other with Islam. The crucial questions of the actual values in which they believed—their cherished ends and chosen means—are smothered in the dubious shared mantle of similarity in which Segev envelops them.

The British on patrol in Tel Aviv, 1948

IV.

One of Segev's implicit assumptions is that the British were supposed to promote Palestinian nationalism, but failed to live up to this expectation. They developed a network of modern transport in Palestine, improved the sanitation system, fought against the scourge of malaria, established hospitals and schools, and improved the infrastructure for the supply of water and electricity. Yet despite the rapid process of urbanization in Palestine as described by Segev, despite the many improvements in communication between the Arab villages and the external world, the old ways in the Arab community remained stubbornly powerful. Segev complains that in their policies toward the Arab community the British wanted to preserve stability and domestic peace, and not to abet a social revolution, which was their practice not only in Palestine but also throughout the Empire. And then Segev remarks: "This was very different though from the support the administration gave to the Zionist revolution."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

That observation exposes the magnitude of Segev's mistaken interpretation of the Mandate. The truth is that the British did not advance either national revolution, Zionist or Palestinian. The ruling power in Palestine, they introduced into the country a colonial edition of European norms of government, manifested in the principle of responsibility of the authorities for the peace, the security, and (to a certain degree) the well-being of the inhabitants. The development of infrastructure in Palestine was a great improvement. Another refreshing innovation was the introduction of a judicial system that was free of corruption and bribery. Security for life and property, except during violent disturbances, was still another beneficial effect of the European administration. But this, *and nothing more,* was the extent of the British contribution to the development of the Jewish National Home.

It is true that the British, in accord with Mandatory regulations, permitted Jewish immigration, subject to certain restrictions which became more stringent with time, and allowed Jews to purchase land. If that is what Segev means by British "support" for the Zionist revolution, then I concur. But if, as the context of the above quotation suggests, Segev means to say that the British actively encouraged social or cultural developments in the Jewish community in Palestine, then he is making a claim without any foundation.

Segev states elsewhere that the Jews developed their own infrastructure: a political system (misleadingly termed by him a "state within a state"), health services, an educational system, a defense force. He fails to point out the uniqueness of those structures: they operated on a voluntary basis, with no support whatever from the Mandate government. Though the British did not interfere with Jews in their efforts to develop autonomy, they provided no assistance. Segev considers the educational system in the *Yishuv* a central factor in forging a Jewish identity and a common national purpose. There is some truth in this, though Segev again overstates the case. There were other forces pulling the Jewish community in the same direction.

But the Jews certainly did press forward in the development of their educational system. In accordance with age-old Jewish tradition, education was a powerful concern—not just for the sake of the individual, but for the sake of the entire community. By contrast, the Arab leaders in Palestine at the time failed to recognize the crucial importance of education and were unwilling to make the necessary investment in it. Segev here seems to expect the British to have done for the Arabs what the Jews did for themselves. Since the British did not do so—for financial reasons, or because colonial officials were inclined to be suspicious about too much education for the natives—Segev interprets the British indifference to Arab education as an example of indirect British "assistance" to Zionism.

The fact is that the British were suspicious, and even contemptuous, of the educational system that the Jews were building in Palestine, viewing it as excessive, as an undesirable emphasis on Jewish identity and therefore of Zionist ideology. But the Jews stuck to their priorities in a number of areas, the British views notwithstanding, including education, health services, settlement, and social welfare. Segev makes no mention of the seriously limited social legislation in Palestine during the Mandate. The British administration, largely conservative, was deeply suspicious of any progressive social legislation, believing that it smacked of "communism." And so there is little basis for the claim that they actually assisted in the *Yishuv*'s advancement. Nor was the *Yishuv* waiting for British help.

In his summation of the consequences of the British Mandate, Segev stresses its failure to establish a system of compulsory Arab education. The lack of such a system, he argues, impeded the process of social consolidation between urban Arabs and rural Arabs, and between regions. The resulting low degree of social cohesion was to prove devastating for the Arabs in the 1948 war. This is Segev's conclusion: "Had Britain limited its support for Zionism to nothing other than perpetuating Arab illiteracy, His Majesty's Government could still claim to have kept the promise enshrined in the Balfour Declaration." This statement alleges some kind of hidden link between the demonstrable lack of British interest in developing Arab education and their ostensible support for Zionism. Since the British failed to nurture those areas that the Arab national movement had neglected, the British must have been pro-Zionist.

Segev's statement also reflects his rhetorical strategy: two unrelated factors are linked in terms of cause and effect, momentarily stunning the reader with what would seem to be a new historical insight. Another instance of this discursive method is the following contrast (coming after an account of the surge in Jewish immigration to Palestine in the 1930s): "The rise of the Nazis thus proved advantageous for the Zionist movement; for the Arabs, the developments in Germany eroded their strength." The stunned reader (Segev's intention is always to stun) is given a deftly distorted picture: a covert connection between the Nazis and the Zionists, while it is the Arabs who, rather astonishingly, become the real victims of the situation. The truth is that the Nazi takeover precipitated a deepening crisis in the situation of the Jews worldwide, undermining their bargaining position with the British; but it provided the Arabs, by contrast, with greater diplomatic flexibility. They could suddenly choose between support for Great Britain or support for Nazi Germany. Segev's assertion can be more accurately formulated in precisely the opposite terms: the rise of the Nazis proved advantageous for the Arab national movement; whereas for the Jews in Palestine, the developments in Germany eroded their strength.

SEGEV IS A grand master of hindsight. In his hands, the pang of collective guilt among Jews about the fate of their brethren who perished in the Holocaust—a pang of extraordinary moral sensitivity and historical complexity—becomes an instrument of emotional manipulation. Segev begins his report of a special fund set up in Palestine to finance the return to Europe of Jews with incurable illnesses this way: "Three years after the Nazis came to power in Germany, with World War II on its way ..." As if it was known in 1936 that a great war would soon erupt, culminating in Auschwitz!

With the same tactic of innuendo, Segev criticizes the speech delivered by Ben-Gurion to the Mapai faction at the Zionist Congress in August 1939, in which he attempted to persuade his colleagues to join in a struggle against the British government 1939 White Paper, which had proclaimed a virtual freeze on the development of the National Home: "Less than two weeks before the outbreak of war, *Ben-Gurion complains 'it is the fate of* Palestine that lies in the balance.'" But Ben-Gurion was not complaining; he was exhorting, or warning, or declaring. It is certainly true that this event occurred two weeks before the beginning of World War II, but Ben-Gurion did not know that. From where he stood, it was the future of Zionism that was in imminent danger.

Segev then rebukes the Jews in Palestine for their anxieties about what would happen to them during the war: they should have been exercised by the fate of the Jews in Europe, not by their own fate. Yet considering the fact that Palestine was twice threatened by German invasion during the war, the apprehension had some basis in reality. Moreover, the Jewish community in Palestine was afraid of being cut off from the Diaspora as a result of the war. The *Yishuv* still felt dependent on European Jewry for people, resources, and political support. The great shift in the relation between the *Yishuv* and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Diaspora was still to come.

One of Segev's most provocative assertions concerns the White Paper of 1939, which put a halt to Jewish immigration for the duration of the war. "The restriction on immigration levied a price in human life," he writes, "but the White Paper's role in the Holocaust is, in the end, relatively small". What does he mean by "relatively small"? Small, if measured against the millions who perished? Maybe. But surely we cannot gloss over the fact that the White Paper blocked the path of escape for Jews in Europe. Segev argues that it was physically impossible to provide refuge to millions of Jews in Palestine. I do not doubt that this is true. But consider the facts: Jews were granted permission to leave the Third Reich until late 1941, and they would have departed in the thousands if there had been some place to go. And thousands could have left Romania throughout the war. But the doors to Palestine were shut tight.

It is worth noting that an exhibit in the new wing dedicated to the Holocaust in the British Imperial War Museum in London addresses this serious question, noting (with fine British reserve) that the White Paper indeed "affected" the options for Jewish rescue; but Segev does not think it did. There are two reasons that might explain his view. The first is that the provocateur likes to provoke, to upset the common wisdom regardless of the historical record. The second is that he insists upon the "pro-Zionist" character of the British Mandate.

Segev likes to present insoluble dilemmas. He tosses up "maybe yes, maybe no" questions and leaves them hanging, broaching somewhat melodramatically the chances that were missed, the possibilities that were unrealized—in the best cases as the result of shortsightedness, in the worst cases as the product of some evil design. About abortive rescue initiatives during the war, he observes insinuatingly that "large question marks hang over major rescue activities." I assume that they will continue to hang there till the end of days. On the attempt to reach an understanding between Jewish and Arab leaders on the eve of the 1929 disturbances, he conjectures: "Had the Jewish and Arab leaders published a call for restraint that night they could, perhaps, have prevented the bloodbath that began just a few hours later. Perhaps not." Another question without an answer. In describing the series of bloody bombings in Jerusalem during the final months of the Mandate, he surmises that they could have been perpetrated by British soldiers or by Arabs. Or (here he adds yet a third hypothesis) "maybe" they were the work of Jews who wanted to stage a provocation, his "proof" being that Jewish agents sometimes operated disguised in British uniforms. This suggestion makes little sense and is totally without foundation—yet it will likely be quoted as pure truth in the next book on the Mandate, with a footnote referring to Segev's mischievous book.

V.

Most of *One Palestine, Complete* centers on the 1920s. Only the final 130 or so pages treat the period from the Arab Rebellion (1936-39) to the British withdrawal from Palestine subsequent to the vote of the General Assembly of the United Nations on November 29, 1947. Disproportionately lengthy chapters are devoted to the short-lived British military government, which was in force for a mere two years, from the British conquest until the establishment of civilian government in the wake of the Nabi Musa riots in Jerusalem in April 1920. Segev's aim is to prove that this military government, too, had pro-Zionist leanings—an impossible task, in the light of the many quotations in his own book that prove precisely the opposite.

Segev has ambivalent feelings about Herbert Samuel, the first High Commissioner, a Jew and a Zionist. Samuel was too Zionist and too British for Segev to admire; but the commissioner was under such heavy attack by the Zionists that Segev considers it only proper to defend him. Samuel was a figure of controversy not only in his own time, but also for historians today. Elie Kedourie believed that Samuel's actions in the wake of the disturbances in 1921 courted disaster. In order to appease the Arabs, he halted Jewish immigration and appointed Hajj Amin Al-Husseini the mufti of Jerusalem. In so doing, argued Kedourie, Samuel surrendered to violence and handed power to the Arab extremists. Segev defends Samuel's policy of appeasement, seeing it as a means of guaranteeing public order in Palestine. He also justifies his appointment of Husseini, even contending that Husseini changed his skin in the face of the riots, metamorphosing from an agitator for violence into a man of politics.

Now, it is possible to argue for Samuel's policies as the only possible way to ensure that the British did not renege on their commitments and abandon the Mandate at this early stage in the consolidation of the Jewish National Home. But surely there is no need to present Hajj Amin Al-Husseini as a righteous man, a paragon of peace. Husseini took great pains not to do anything that might jeopardize his position as mufti of Jerusalem, an office to which he was appointed by the Mandate



Thousands of titles to choose from—Economics, Philosophy, Politics, and other Conservative Non-Fiction. More than any other unabridged publisher. Authors such as **WILL, KIRK, BUCKLEY O'ROURKE, MISES, RAND, SOWELL, ALDER, & MORE.**

For a Free Catalog with a $6.00 Off Coupon Inside write or call: Dept NR • P.O. Box 969 • Ashland, OR 97520

1-800-729-2665
www.blackstoneaudio.com

BLACKSTONE AUDIOBOOKS
RECORDINGS THAT INSPIRE, EDUCATE, ENTERTAIN

IMAGINE YOURSELF IMMORTALIZED IN THE POP ART STYLE OF THE 60'S &70'S...
www.wsservice.com/neo60
(630)953-2033
Brilliantly colored acrylic & silkscreen on canvas
Neo 60 Studios

CONSIDER THIS:

- 84% of TNR readers plan to travel in the next 12 months
- 91% of TNR readers dine out
- 92% of TNR readers purchased books in the past year
- 85% of TNR readers contribute to worthy causes

(Source: MRI 1999 Custom Subscriber Study)

GOT YOUR ATTENTION?

ADVERTISE WITH
THE NEW REPUBLIC
SMALL SPACE PROGRAM.

Please call
(212) 924-8700
for reservations and information.

Put Your Message in Front of 100,000 Consumers!

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

authorities. Moreover, the British allocated large tracts of land to the Waqf in Jerusalem, which was under his control; and as a result of these acquisitions Husseini had large amounts of money at his disposal, with which he was able to bolster his position in the Arab world. Husseini's subsequent collusion with Hitler is further proof of his true nature. There is painfully little evidence to support Segev's provocative interpretation of the mufti.

SEGEV'S TREATMENT OF the Arab Rebellion of 1936-1939 is one of the most interesting parts of his book. Along with a good account of the high-handed British treatment of the rebels, Segev also recounts the insurgents' achievements, including their success in unfurling their flag over the Old City in Jerusalem. The description of the social transformation in Arab society that resulted from the rebellion—characterized by Segev as the struggle between the *kaffiyeh*, the traditional headdress of the Arab villager, and the turban, the accepted male head covering in urban areas—is fascinating. But what was happening during that same period inside the Jewish community in Palestine? Segev gives no parallel description. He highlights the opening of the Tel Aviv port, seeing it as important practically and symbolically; but for the *Yishuv* this was hardly the most significant event of the period.

The policy of the Jewish Agency during the Arab Rebellion was one of *havlagah*, or "self-restraint." It did not seek retaliation for Arab attacks. The aim of this policy was to prevent the British from being able to portray the Arab Rebellion as a kind of civil war in Palestine, as previous riots had been presented. If the Jews were innocent victims, then there was no justification to halt Jewish immigration—which was the principal Arab objective. The policy of restraint achieved its goals. For the first time, moreover, the British were prepared to train the Jews in defense and to arm them. These were major political achievements. In addition, most Jews in the *Yishuv* shrank from engaging in acts of terror against terror, and were adamantly opposed to violence that makes no distinction between the guilty and the innocent.

But Segev gives another explanation for the policy of *havlagah*. He attributes it to fear among Jewish settlers that an attack on the Arabs might provoke a blood feud. This is nonsense. Blood retribution was customary among Arabs in cases of individual killings, but it was absolutely irrelevant during the Arab Rebellion. Only at the end of his discussion does Segev briefly add that a policy of retaliation was considered potentially damaging to cooperation with the British. Apparently reasons having to do with immigration and self-defense are less exciting than the prospect of an exotic vendetta.

THE ROYAL COMMISSION, which entered the history-book annals under the name of its chairman Lord Peel, was dispatched to Palestine in the autumn of 1936, and published its deliberations in 1937; and it is regarded as the most astute of all the numerous commissions that visited Palestine, its report a masterwork of analysis. The commission reached the conclusion that the Mandate in Palestine could not be implemented, since history had proven its fundamental assumption false: that both peoples in Palestine could coexist in peace. Consequently the Peel Commission proposed a plan for the partition of Palestine into two states, Jewish and Arab, with a British-controlled corridor from Jerusalem to Jaffa. For the first time, a proposal was put forward to set up a Jewish state—small, perhaps not viable, but a state nonetheless. There could have been no greater compliment to the Jewish community that had evolved in Palestine over the preceding period of less than twenty years.

For Segev, however, the matter of statehood is marginal. His reading of the commission's report centers on the British: it is here that they first announced their desire to leave Palestine, because the Arab Rebellion made them sick and tired of Palestine. Yet if this was the case, why was the product of that insurgency a prize awarded to the Jews in the form of a Jewish state? If the Arab Rebellion really convinced the British to depart, surely the commission would have recommended independence for one Palestine, unpartitioned, in line with British colonial practice elsewhere. And this brings us to one of the most "original" things in *One Palestine, Complete*: its treatment of the question of who forced the British to leave Palestine.

For decades, that question was central in Israeli political debate, creating great storms of contention between the right and the left. The former claimed that the bold exploits of the Irgun, the right-wing military organization that had split from the Haganah and was engaged in acts of terror, had chased the British out of the country; while the latter argued that the British departure from Palestine had been precipitated by a combination of two factors: the impact of illegal immigration on world public opinion and the impressive operations of the Haganah and the Palmach, the Jewish defense forces linked with the Jewish Agency. But Segev prefers to focus on the Arabs: "The Arab rebellion had made the British sick of Palestine." End of story. And in his introduction, he notes: "By 1939, the Arab rebellion had brought the British to the verge of a decision to go home. It would have been better for them had they left then, but it took them nearly ten more years to act. In the meantime, World War II broke out, and after the war British forces were hit by Jewish terrorism as well. Thousands of them paid for the adventure with their lives."

Indeed, if the British presence in Palestine was the result of the imagined phantom of Jewish power, as Segev claims, then it makes sense that in the aftermath of the rebellion the British arrived at the correct and inescapable conclusion. But if the British involvement in Palestine in the 1930s was part of broader Middle Eastern strategic plans of defending oil pipelines and imperial routes, as in fact it was, then it is highly improbable that the Arab revolt could have convinced them to leave Palestine, especially given the new threat looming in Europe. Since 1938, after all, British policy in the Middle East had been based on the assumption of an imminent world war.

According to the official report of the Colonial Office, casualty figures up to December 1938 (when the Arab rebellion was basically quelled) indicated 98 British soldiers and police officers dead, and 266 wounded. Even if Arab casualties were probably higher than reported (752 dead and 1,459 injured), there is no reason to doubt the figures on the British losses. (The statistics for the Jews were 367 dead, 783 injured.) It is hard to imagine that the British Empire trembled in the face of such casualties. In the 1940s, Jewish terror against the British led to about another 100 lives lost, most of them in the Irgun bombing of the King David Hotel in July 1946; but this is still far less than the "thousands" of victims to whom Segev alludes. Perhaps he has in mind all the British who lost their lives in the war against the Turks in World War I, or against the Germans in North Africa in World War II. But those casualties were hardly the result of the "Palestinian adventure," as Segev terms British involvement in Palestine. They were a part of the price of global British interests, for the sake of which Britain fought two world wars. The most honest comment on this matter came from Clement Atlee, the British prime minister after the war (this is quoted by Segev): "To abandon India ... but to have a war with the Jews in order to give Palestine to the Arabs, appears to carry incongruity of thought and policy to levels which have rarely been attained in human history."

When, in 1947, the sun set on the Raj, the jewel in the crown of the British

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

William Faulkner
Noun, Place and Verb

memory he said believes he said
and himself did who has himself
memory and did himself believe
and then remember to recollect,
whose name was william faulkner
whose place was mississippi
and whose verb was tell.

memory he wrote believes before knowing
remembers, believes longer than recollects
longer than knowing even wonders
knows remembers believes, he himself said
believing himself and mississippi august skylight
mississippi thickets in september twilight,
believing the dry hysteria: *something*
is going to happen I am going to do something
something is going to happen to me

and memory no less in mississippi than elsewhere
believes knows tells this:
the mississippiness of ancient oracles
of albatross sins ancestral; recollects remembers this:
pre-summersmell of wisteria
oldentime ladies in rooms unsanctuary
amid mississippi gothic behind cottonwhite
totems doric corinthian scotch irish
(O clytemnestra my black one
O my firstborn son and brother)

and this also believes: cypress and gum trees
beach, cane and briar and three-note birdsong
reflections in branch water; mississippi distant horns
and gas engine smells fading beyond now and fury.
and this recollects and knows the significance of:
black human blood red on butcher knives
white female blood on phallic corn cobs.

memory believing yoknapatawpha indian doom
did not mistake the wilderness for sanctuary
either but wished it so as huntsman
but wishing does not know
forgets and gallops confederate cavalry in gale (tone)
hightower
sermons
wish-fulfilling knighthood (without negroes)
wish-forgiving arrogance and the outrage of human
bondage
wish-denying antebellum insurrections nightmares
while celebrating those who could survive them

but wishing is believing too
because the bones remember
(O canaan look away from dixie
away from bedford forest o railroads
underground freedom bound)

and memory knowing this
knows more (believes infers
more complications than even those
miss rosa colfield's perhaps once glittering
eyes gave quentin compson, who said:
and wants it told)!

memory
believes knows recollects in him *(whose nouns*
were courage and honor and pride and
he says pity and love and even justice
and liberty) believes knows and wonders at
wishing become man-horse-demon
with twenty negroes (shackled) begetting
with one french architect (shanghaied) sutpens
hundred (*without gentleness begot*, miss rosa
colfield says) wonders remembers
aghast but knows mississippi dynasties
of somewhat oedipal
innocence with black
queen-mothers and half brothers
knows jefferson the man and town
and public confederation of decorum; and also knows
remembers eighty miles to memphis
and miss reba's sanctum sanctorum of law and order
and sportsmanship
believes remembers
recollects, records in commissary ledgers
pharaoh-tale-accounts compounded in confounding
convolutions of all-too-human-impacted
good intentions which at any rate
reveal (or partly unconceal) himself:
william faulkner hamlet-hounded master
of mulatto metaphors among macbeths
in county court houses castles out-demographed
by ever in-creeping miscegenated thickets

nigger? the sheriff said in hot pursuit
of the inherently illusive mississippi christmas,
nigger? he said. maybe nigger, maybe not
they told him then
whose memory like theirs believed in shadows
as much as men

Albert Murray

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Empire, Palestine ceased to be strategically important. It had cost Britain a great deal, materially and in terms of world public opinion. At the end of the 1930s, the British had been able to impose a solution in Palestine. They forced a policy on the Jews that was expected to freeze the building of the Jewish National Home, dooming it to decline. In the late 1940s, Great Britain was weakened by the war and dependent on the United States, and so it was no longer in a position to impose any solution. It simply gave up and left.

SEGEV IS CONSISTENT in depicting the British as pro-Zionist down to the bitter end. British historians have seen the closing period of the Mandate as a time of chaos, an inglorious chapter in the history of the British Empire. The conventional wisdom among Jews was that the British displayed favoritism toward the Arabs: the authorities provided them with fortified police stations, confiscated weapons from the Jews, and even compelled Palmach fighters who had taken control of Sheikh Jarrah, an Arab neighborhood in Jerusalem on the road to Mount Scopus, to evacuate the area. Segev paints just the opposite picture, claiming they handed over administration in an orderly fashion to the Jews.

Again, Segev toys with one of his unresolvables: "How the administration would have acted had the Arabs also had a government-in-waiting remains an open question." He goes on to argue that British plans for evacuation, from south to north, "left responsibility for Jewish population centers in British hands almost to the very last moment, thus impeding Arab war plans." Aside from Segev's desire to strengthen his thesis of the pro-Zionist British, it is difficult to understand on what this claim is based. The British withdrew from Tel Aviv and other Jewish centers within a short time after the United Nations resolution, a process that was concluded by April 1948. They remained closed off in certain areas of Jerusalem, without any contact with the Jewish population. They were interested solely in securing their exit routes for evacuation (which is why they removed the Jews from Sheikh Jarrah, which lay directly in their path of evacuation). Their withdrawal route went largely through Arab areas.

The British did not defend Jewish centers of population, just as they did not defend Arab centers. According to the historian Moti Golani, who was recently able to examine the relevant British documents, the withdrawing British acted according to a single criterion: in each locality, they transferred power to the stronger community. Thus, in Tiberias they transferred power to the Jews, and in Safed to the Arabs. The Arabs accepted the British policy and acted accordingly, and the Jews did not. So the Arabs departed Tiberias, but the Jews stayed in Safed and after a bitter fight conquered the town. In Haifa, the British cooperated with the Jews when it became clear that they were in control. Documents relating to Arab war plans have so far not been open to researchers; but the conjecture that the British interfered with those war plans is truly a tale plucked from *A Thousand and One Nights*.

Current historiography on the Mandate period is no longer dominated by a demonization of the British, which was a recurrent theme during the first decades of the state. Yet the disintegration of the old mythology is no reason to create a new mythology, this one a fantasy of John Bull in Palestine as a kind of disoriented Santa Claus, as in Segev's skewed account. The British presented the Jews with a one-time historic opportunity to lay the foundation for a Jewish state. They provided the Arabs with a government that was fair and progressive, the likes of which they had never known. The government in London sympathized with Zionism sometimes, but not always; the administration in Jerusalem sympathized with the Arabs most of the time, but not always. Both sides of the Palestinian divide benefited from the British and were frustrated by the British. In the last resort, what mattered most was not what the British did, but what the Jews and the Arabs did.

Segev does not pretend to have written the definitive work on the Mandate period, and this is laudable. His use of diaries, letters, and similar source material lends the book a special grace; and he has an engaging style, which serves him well as long as he remains in the realm of the anecdotal. But he is not satisfied with the anecdotal. He insists upon sweeping generalizations and a comprehensive interpretation of the entire epoch; and in these efforts he fails. He cannot resist the urge to contrariness, and this leads him to extreme statements that may be shocking but are also absurd. Segev goes to great pains to maintain the position of the outsider, to show no empathy for anyone. But does the standpoint of an external observer really facilitate a genuine understanding of events? Or does the external observer see only the externals of things? Refracted in Segev's prism, all that was innocent and wholesome, enthusiastic and idealistic, becomes pompous, political, and ugly. He punctures every sentimental balloon, and the result is that the spirit of the era has eluded him. This is not one Palestine, and it is not complete. ■

—translated from the Hebrew by William Templer

Ms. Smith Goes to Washington

By DAVID BROOKS

Talk to Me: Listening Between the Lines by Anna Deavere Smith

(Random House, 288 pp., $24.95)

WHERE IS THE Edith Wharton of our day, come forth to lay bare the *beau monde* where money intersects with propriety? Where is the sharp-eyed observer prowling the salons of Cambridge, Palo Alto, and the Upper East Side, the plush conferences of Aspen and Jackson Hole, the moneyed hush of the great foundations? We don't know when such a novelist will emerge, but when she does, we may be sure that she will seize instantly on the career of Anna Deavere Smith, the Goddess of Multiculturalism, the exemplar who stands at the nexus of all that is well funded and high-minded.

Smith is Ann O'Day Maples Professor of the Arts at Stanford University. She is simultaneously the founder and the director of the Institute on the Arts and Civic Dialogue at Harvard University. She has

DAVID BROOKS is the author of *Bobos in Paradise: The New Upper Class and How They Got There* (Simon & Schuster).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had roles in right-thinking movies, such as Rob Reiner's homage to polite society liberalism, *The American President*. She wins grants beyond all imagining. Her one-woman plays—which tend to be about impeccably lofty and urgent subjects such as the L.A. race riots—are funded by the most worthy theater companies across America: the Goodman Theater, the Arena Stage, the Intimann Theater, the New York Shakespeare Festival. Here is a woman, clearly, who must get down on her knees nightly and give thanks for the 501(c)(3) tax deductions, all the while bemoaning the oppression that she suffers as a black woman in a racist and patriarchal society.

In Smith's startlingly silly new book, there are stray sentences that give one just passing glimpses of what life must be like to be the pet *penseuse* of the privileged classes: "I was on Martha's Vineyard at the time and soon saw the president at a party..." "I had a month long fellowship at a center that the Rockefeller Foundation runs to provide a workplace for artists and scholars. The setting is an extraordinary villa and grounds that sit on the shore of Lake Como..." "One of the first things an assistant of mine learns is to refer all calls from the press to my press representative. I don't talk directly to the press until it's organized by my rep."

And there are other glimpses of what life must be like for this tribune of the downtrodden amid the shimmering statusphere. Smith makes glancing references to her photographic safari in Zimbabwe, to her stay at the Essex House Hotel on Central Park South, to her relentless shuttling between Washington, New York and Boston, and to the sorts of tips MacArthur grant winners receive: "Don't take your friends out to dinner," she reports Susan Sontag as having advised her. "It's not a lot of money."

But these, alas, are mere glimpses. Smith's purpose here is not to describe what it is like to be the sacred statue of socially approved deviance. Her subject is not her own good fortune. She has a nobler goal: she wishes to describe the culture of Washington, D.C. Or rather, to describe her own noble reaction to the sordid things she finds in Washington, D.C. Like a good citizen who fears for her country, like an anthropologist in her own country, Smith decided that it was time to check out the capital, and take the measure of its depredations. She was appalled to discover that some people in Washington are ambitious; and also that sometimes they are not completely honest in their use of language. For a clean, honest soul fresh from the Rockefeller palace on Lake Bellagio, or the groves of Palo Alto, or the indoor forests of the Ford Foundation, these must have been horrid discoveries indeed.

But first it is important to appreciate how Anna Deavere Smith decamped upon the capital. Someone of her stature could not simply arrive in Washington alone, any more than a Vanderbilt grande dame would think of stepping off the boat at Newport solo. Smith came to Washington with a staff of at least six to arrange interviews for her, not to mention the far-flung help from her press rep, her vocal coach, and some other attendants. The minions prepared research dossiers, ran her office, did advance work for her travel, and accompanied her on trips. Moreover, she hired one of the most prestigious PR firms in town, Powell-Tate, to help cut a path for her through the Potomac jungle. (She reports that she got a good rate.)

Anna Deavere Smith by Victor Juhasz for The New Republic

Nor can one really expect Smith to stay in some hotel room, or rent an anonymous apartment somewhere. No, she stayed, free, in the Theresa Fenwick House, a registered historic monument in Georgetown built in 1826. It is now owned by the upper-crust liberal Republican Congressman Amory Houghton and his wife Priscilla Dewey Houghton. "Priscilla is a lover of the theater," Smith records, "and when they learned that I, a theater artist, needed someplace to sleep and pile my books, she and Amo generously offered an entire empty town house in Georgetown for my use for the five years I would be in and out of Washington." Smith, who is after all a theater artist, notices that on Amo Houghton's home refrigerator is a bumper sticker that reads, "The road to hell is lined with Republicans" with "except Amo" scrawled in his wife's handwriting.

Privileged travelers in the old days would arrive at foreign capitals armed with letters of introduction, granting them immediate access to exclusive homes and offices. And a similar sort of network seems to be at work here. Smith is soon attending state dinners at the White House, supping at the Gridiron dinner, and sharing meals with people named Buchwald, Stephanopoulos, and so on. She is able to interview former presidents Carter and Bush, and she has several meetings with President Clinton. There is a delightful little tidbit about President Clinton greeting Smith during their Oval Office interview. The Chameleon-in-Chief slipped easily into his best *Waiting to Exhale* manner and welcomed her into his office saying, "How you doin', girl?"

But Smith is no ordinary investigator. She is not in Washington merely to ask questions and to report upon her findings. Her goal is altogether more grand. "I am a student of words," she writes. "I travel in pursuit of language. My tape recorder is my camera." She has a mystical belief in the revelatory power of language and in her own ability to decipher whatever it is that language really reveals. She says that she is able to probe the hidden recesses of a person's soul by paying close attention to the rhythms and the phrasings of their speech. As she describes her extraordinary powers of perception, Smith begins to sound less like a society grande dame and more like one of those occultists who used to travel among the British aristocracy holding séances—a perfect cross between Deborah Tannen and Madame Blavatsky.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Here is one summary of her method: "Character, then, seemed to me to be an improvisation on given rhythms. The more successful you were at improving on language, the more jazz you have, the more likely you could be found in your language, that is, if you wanted to be found in your language."

THERE ARE SEVERAL passages along these lines, and after reading and re-reading them I confess that I do not know what the hell she is talking about. The only rule that Smith seems to apply with any consistency is that the content of what people say is totally irrelevant, and that people who inflect their voices a lot have better character than people who do not inflect their voices. It is not substance that Smith seeks, and admires, in her subjects; it is "jazz." She could not care less about the truth or the falsity of what people tell her. She cares only for the aural spectacle. She is, after all, a theater person. And so everything that she touches turns into theater; and thus she comes away from the capital—which, whatever else you may think about it, is a serious place in which very complicated ideas and programs are regularly discussed—understanding exactly nothing about it.

Smith will not be denied "jazz." Her method forbids her from merely quoting the people whom she interviews. That would be too great a concession to the prosaic nature of ordinary language, to the prosaic nature of ordinary reality. And so she transcribes her subjects' answers and lays them out in verse form. From her book you would think that everybody in Washington is a slamming poet in Brooks Brothers. Here, for example, is how she prints an answer by Todd Purdum of *The New York Times*:

> You see, the big thing
> this is the other thing—
> it's better to be on the press charter,
> because the press charter is all first-class
> seats.
> Air Force One has first class seats, too
> but it's much roomier,
> and it's all designed to compensate the
> press.
> But, um, you know, they try, they do the
> best they can.
> But the network people are particularly—
> cushy.
> And they have minions to carry their
> things around,
> and we're just not all there
> but they have burdens we don't have, too.

Smith peppers the book with dozens of such disquisitions in free verse. She never comments on the passages themselves, or tells us what we might learn from the rhythms that she gives to them. Myself, I could not find that breaking the quotations into odd bits added anything, but I don't like to think of myself as closed-minded. Maybe Todd Purdum really does have a Black Mountain soul.

It occurred to me that if you take speech or writing and transform it into poetry by randomly striking the return key on the keyboard, some magical significance may indeed emerge. And so I tried Smith's technique on some of her own passages. These passages, you will observe, appear on the surface to be exactly the sort of pious banalities one hears so frequently at foundation-sponsored panel discussions and in worthy commission reports. They fill up page after page of this complacent book. Unless, of course, the meaning of Smith's enterprise is not to be found on the surface, and she has concealed the real meaning in her own "jazz." So, having broken the code, I read her this way:

> In this time of
> global economy and business mergers
> happening as often as
> sunrise and sunset,
> where is the human merger?
> Where is the real human engagement?
> Maybe the very help that politics
> needs can come from someplace
> other than
> the halls of Congress or the
> desktops of the punditry.
> Maybe our leaders need
> more voices from the
> outside.
>
> Most humans
> adopt a persona
> in order to interface with the
> society
> around them,
> no matter how large or small.

Nope. The versification improves nothing. The banality is still crushing.

There is no conclusion to Smith's book. It just ends with a bunch of those quotation-poems. Smith has no argument or theory. She has done no thinking, nor interrupted her tony travels long enough to reflect on the political and social system that passed before her eyes and ears in Washington. Her book is only the self-congratulatory journal of a celebrity on tour. Smith has stopped by Washington and she has graced its A-list with her presence. With her shimmering bearing and her impeccably fashionable opinions, she has allowed the fortunate few in Washington to glimpse a fatuity even higher and more self-regarding than the capital's own. And so she has lifted us all, if only for a moment, out of our quotidian and jazzless lives. Excuse me. What I mean is,

> she has lifted us
> all,
> if only for a moment,
> out of our quotidian and jazzless
> lives. ■

Subject Matter Matters

By ALAN WOLFE

Left Back: A Century of Failed School Reforms by Diane Ravitch

(Simon and Schuster, 555 pp., $30)

IMAGINE A SMALL group of revolutionaries intent on taking over society. Certain that they know what is best for all, they insist that science undergirds their venture, and as a result they produce jargon incomprehensible to anyone but themselves. Cloaking their ideology in the rhetoric of democracy, they dismiss all opposition as elitist, even if they really believe that most people are incapable of thinking for themselves. They are remarkably successful in their takeover, if for no other reason than that their single-minded determination enables them to purge dissenters and to ignore critics. Once in charge, their work consists of one failure after another, but this in no way leads them toward introspection or apology. By century's end few take them seriously, but their control

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is so tenacious that no one can safely assume that they will ever be dislodged.

Such, in brief outline, is the plot of Diane Ravitch's account of how educational progressives have taken over, and nearly destroyed, America's public schools. Expressed in such schematic fashion, her treatment seems a caricature of what is surely a more complicated affair. And yet, once one has digested the extraordinary material that she has assembled, it becomes clear that Ravitch does not exaggerate. *Left Back* is the most important book written in many decades about America's most important public institution.

For many late-nineteenth-century educators, it was axiomatic that schooling ought to inculcate academic skills. Charles W. Eliot, the president of Harvard, advocated that schools stress "the power to think, reason, observe, and describe." William Torrey Harris, Superintendent of Schools in St. Louis and then U.S. Commissioner of Education, emphasized that the freedom to control one's life emerges out of the discipline required to direct oneself toward that purpose. In 1892, the National Education Association created the Committee of Ten, a blue-ribbon panel that included Eliot and Harris. Its report, published in 1893, summarized the leading educational ideas of the period. It was a reform document that sided with the teaching of new subjects, including the sciences. It frowned on memorization, but it insisted that schools should train the minds of all the students who attended them, even if only a few secondary school students would go on to college. "Every subject which is taught at all in a secondary school should be taught in the same way and to the same extent to every pupil so long as he pursues it," the report urged, "no matter what the probable destination of the pupil may be, or at what point his education is to cease."

As Eliot and Harris were putting their pedagogical conceptions down on paper, a movement began to develop committed to the idea, expressed by John Dewey in 1897, that the school "must represent present life—life as real and vital to the child as that which he carries on in the home, in the neighborhood, or on the playground." As Ravitch recounts the beliefs of the reformers who began to cluster around Dewey, not all of which Dewey himself endorsed, they amount to four distinct efforts: a mental-testing movement designed to measure who would benefit most from which type of instruction; a child-centered movement that maintained that, in matters of education, the needs of the child come first; a social efficiency movement whose premise was that schools should serve social needs; and a social reconstruction movement committed to using the schools to reform society's inequities. The ideas that linked these movements were not always compatible, but what held them together, Ravitch argues, is that they all shared one fundamental commitment: distrustful of the life of the mind, they were determined to move the schools away from the Committee of Ten's insistence of high academic standards designed to be met by all students.

In this post-*Bell Curve* era, we sometimes forget that the movement for IQ testing emerged as a progressive force. Edward L. Thorndike, one of the founders of educational psychology, attacked the idea that training in one activity transfers over into another. If learning Latin has no demonstrable effect on how effective one will be as a worker, why not teach work skills directly? And as intelligence tests became more refined, they offered to school administrators a way to distinguish between those who would benefit most from an academic curriculum and those on whom academic training would essentially be wasted.

Why raise the expectations of students who lacked the qualities necessary to succeed? Would it not be better to give them the kind of training that would help them in the here-and-now? Justified on the grounds that classification by intelligence was in the best interests of all, educational testing would move schools far away from the ideals associated with men such as Eliot and Harris. "The decision to offer different educational programs, depending on children's IQ," Ravitch writes, "repudiated the fundamental concept of the American common school idea, which was to provide the same curriculum to all children in the first eight years of their schooling."

G. Stanley Hall, otherwise known as the man who invited Sigmund Freud to lecture in the United States, instigated the child-study movement in America, treating the formal academic curriculum as an interference with the natural curiosity of children. Similarly romantic views of children led John and Alice Dewey to create the Laboratory School at the University of Chicago in 1896 and formed the basis of the "project method" developed by William Heard Kilpatrick of Teachers College at Columbia University. (The project method essentially urged students to pursue activities that emerged out of their own curiosity.) Ravitch treats Dewey fairly, noting, for example that the Lab School did include a role for academic subjects and that, designed for relatively few students, it was not held up as a model for all. But she is much harsher on Kilpatrick, a man who responded to criticism from Robert Maynard Hutchins in 1937 by comparing him to Hitler: "When you have a professed absolute, then you have to have some authority to give it content, and there the dictator comes in."

An even more arrogant educator brought back to life by Ravitch is David Snedden. Commissioner of Education in Massachusetts from 1909 until 1915, and later a professor at Columbia Teachers College, Snedden developed nothing less than a theory of social control. Society could no longer rely on autocratic means to win legitimacy, he argued; it needed instead the cooperation of its members. For this, schools could play an important function, not to undermine the social order but to change "the motives leading to submission to it." A leader of the social-efficiency movement, Snedden disdained the teaching of actual subjects such as history and mathematics in favor of providing students with "ideals of right social action." Those who insisted that all students were capable of doing academic work he dismissed as "wrapped up in the cocoons of blind faiths, untested beliefs, hardened customs."

If the right theories about learning could remake the schools, why couldn't they also remake society? The ideas of educational reformers began to have their strongest impact in the 1930s, a time when the Great Depression encouraged radical proposals designed to overcome capitalism's inherent instability. George Counts, who would later become a passionate critic of Soviet communism, was one of many educators who went to the Soviet Union and came back intent on linking education with social reform. In 1932, Counts published *Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order?*, answering with a firm yes. Other educators agreed with Counts, and unlike him they never lost their faith in some kind of top-down planning. From such a perspective, schools that encouraged genius, let alone those that talked of children's inherent creativity, came to be viewed, in their anarchic individualism, as lamentable instruments of capitalistic values. Thus did school reformers become promoters of adjustment and conformity—which was one reason why, despite their leftist politics, even the most conservative districts found something to like in the reformers' ideas and approaches.

Not everyone agreed with these educational advocates. In 1923, Carl Brigham, a Princeton psychologist, published *A Study of American Intelligence*, which suggested that the Nordic races were intellectually superior to the Mediterranean; by 1930, Brigham, now at the College Board, was calling his earlier views "without foundation," since they did not

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

take into account the fact that familiarity with English could influence IQ scores. (His story is told in greater detail in Nicholas Lemann's *The Big Test*.) William C. Bagley, although identified with the social efficiency movement, became a critic of figures such as David Snedden and expressed his skepticism toward the progressive attack on academic subject matter. Isaac Kandel, the first Jew to teach at Teachers College, offered a devastating critique of the movement's anti-intellectualism in his book *The Cult of Uncertainty* in 1943. "Education is not a commodity which can be handed over the counter as in a department store or a cafeteria, nor can the selection of its constituent elements be left wholly to the learner," he wrote. "Society has as much interest in the character of the education given in its schools as has the individual." In the topsy-turvy world of educational reform, these men who wanted to offer everyone, including immigrants and African Americans, the opportunity to advance by their own efforts, came to be called reactionaries. (It did not help that one of them, Michael J. Demiashkevich, who wrote books arguing passionately for the reading of books, really was a reactionary.)

DESPITE THE EFFORTS of the critics, a new consensus about schools solidified itself in the 1940s. This consensus held that subject matter and the academic curriculum were outmoded; that the curriculum should never be prescribed by city or state officials but jointly planned by teachers and pupils; that it should be based on students' interests and needs, not on the logical organization of subjects; that experiences and activities were more valuable to students than reading and study; that schools should offer different programs to different groups of students, depending on whether they were preparing for work or college; that students should be promoted every year, regardless of their performance; and that professional educators should think of themselves as social engineers, empowered to decide what was best for students and the rest of society.

As convinced as educators were by their goals and their methods, the public never really accepted this consensus. The result, once the shocks of the Depression and World War II came to an end, was a full-scale revolt against the schools. During the 1950s, educational traditionalists began to attack their mediocrity. Schools failed to teach Johnny how to read. Their poor performance made Sputnik possible. Schools of education downplayed subject matter.

As Ravitch tells the story, educational reformers were at first taken aback by all the criticism. But they quickly learned to meet any change through a two-pronged response that simultaneously denied that their ideas were all that innovative and then took credit for the innovations they introduced. Nobody was more helpful to their cause than James Conant, the former President of Harvard, whose book *The American High School Today*, which appeared in 1959, was (in Ravitch's words) "the whitewash the educational establishment had been hoping for."

One sees echoes of the 1950s in contemporary controversies over schooling. Efforts to create national standards produced either complete failure (in the teaching of English), contentious controversy (in the teaching of history) or excessive reliance on jargon (in the teaching of math). Illustrative of all these contemporary debates is the argument over the "whole language" approach to reading that became popular in the 1980s and 1990s. The advocates of "whole language" insisted that reading should be learned as naturally as speaking, making unnecessary any reliance on "phonics," a traditional approach which teaches students to recognize the forty-four basic speech sounds formed by the twenty-six letters of the alphabet. Children come already equipped, they said, with richly inventive language skills that schools ought to cultivate, not to replace. Citing studies proving the value of this approach, Kenneth Goodman of the University of Arizona accused traditionalists of having a "flat-Earth view of the world" and of advancing the cause of "the Far Right." As in the 1950s, the education establishment was unwilling to concede any ground at all. As late as December 1999, the annual meeting of the National Council of Teachers of English formally opposed phonics instruction.

RAVITCH, BY CONTRAST, IS NO scorched-earth traditionalist. She does not oppose the whole-language approach: in her view, students need to learn both phonics and efforts at reading comprehension. Indeed, Ravitch has kind words to say about progressive education when it is done right. If reformers can be faulted for neglecting academic rigor, she argues, traditionalists sometimes ignore the real needs of children. "At their best, both philosophies have made valuable and complementary contributions to American education," Ravitch writes. She especially admires Theodore Sizer, Deborah Meier, and Howard Gardner for bringing up to date "the strain of progressivism that championed students' joy in learning without denying the importance of academic disciplines...."

School reformers, in Ravitch's view, made three big mistakes. Schools should not try to solve society's problems. They should avoid offering different curricula to different students. And they should avoid responding to the immediate instincts of their students. Once those mistakes are avoided, Ravitch continues, there are many ways to achieve the proper goal of cultivating qualities of mind, including efforts to recognize and to appreciate multiple intelligences as well as attempts to find lively, even relevant, ways to impart knowledge.

We tend to look for educational reformers belonging on the left and for educational traditionalists on the right. Yet many of Ravitch's antagonists believed in the idea of inherent genetic inferiority, while Ravitch's commitment to academic education for all seems naturally compatible with racial, and even economic, equality. Now that educational reformers are in charge of American education, moreover, they are the true conservatives, committed to defending whatever exists against any change that would undermine their privileges. To the degree that education remains a hotly contested political issue, we will increasingly see odd alliances: hippies and conservative Christians in favor of home-schooling, African Americans and white Catholics in favor of vouchers, old-fashioned leftists and political conservatives in favor of standards, multiculturalists and advertisers in favor of "relevance."

In such a world, Ravitch's plea for a new emphasis on academic subject matter is anything but a right-wing manifesto. Political debates, moreover, involve matters of public policy, while educational doctrines involve fundamental philosophical ideas about human nature and human purpose. It ought not to be surprising that one of Ravitch's heroes, William T. Harris, was an American follower of Hegel, nor that G. Stanley Hall, whose romanticism was fueled by a reading of Rousseau's *Émile*, could write that "there is one thing in nature, and one alone ... fit to inspire all true men and women with more awe and reverence than Kant's starry heavens, and that is the soul and the body of the healthy young child." When we argue over schools, we engage in a debate that has divided philosophers at least since the advent of modernity.

Are we in charge of own fate? Is character there inside us, needing only to be brought to light? Or does character require formation, the presence of some external authority to guide our actions and help us understand who we really are? Ravitch herself clearly sides with the *bildung* tradition of Kant and Hegel against the naturalism of Rousseau and Dewey. "Whether or not individuals get a better

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

job with a better education," she writes, "they will nonetheless find personal, lifelong value in their knowledge of history and literature, science and social science, art and mathematics." Autonomy is an essential value without which no person can be fully human; but to possess autonomy, a person must learn how to reason, how to interpret the lessons of the past, how to speak and write effectively, and how to appreciate great works of human creation.

RAVITCH'S POLITICAL BALANCE is not matched by a balanced treatment of the two sides to her story. One does not find many kind words offered in defense of zealous progressives, nor much sympathy for today's educational establishment. She quotes Alice Miel, a professor at Columbia Teachers College: "To change the curriculum of the school ... means bringing about changes in people" which in turn implies "methods of arousing dissatisfaction," and Miel's words alone suggest the kind of pompous self-certainty that drives Ravitch to distraction. Those educators who insisted on training students for jobs, especially when, as in the case of African Americans, jobs were few, Ravitch denounces as practicing "social adjustment in its meanest sense." And more ideological versions of multiculturalism that insist on teaching students from non-European backgrounds the positive aspects of their culture represent, in her view, "an inverted form of racism."

Critics may respond to Ravitch by pointing out how public education, despite its many problems, still works. Surely there are many good public schools remaining in America, and one will always find good teachers who give of themselves so that others may learn. Yet *Left Back* is not an attack on public schools, or on those who teach in them nor even on the American Federation of Teachers, whose leaders share Ravitch's views on the need for higher standards. It is instead a no-holds-barred criticism of the educational-industrial complex, that huge industry of unreconstructed ed schools, academic researchers, school administrators, organizations like the National Education Association, textbook publishers, and public ideologues who insist that, for whatever reason, not all students need to be taught in rigorous academic fashion.

I am myself generally unsympathetic to one-sided treatments of issues, but Ravitch's side-taking is more than justified. The way in which American public schools came to advance the agenda of a self-interested, narrow-minded, politically biased, intellectually mediocre, and anti-democratic establishment is one of the great scandals of our time. If anything, considering the stakes involved in democratic education, Ravitch shows admirable restraint.

The costs of anti-intellectual education will in the first instance be borne by those who can least afford to pay them: poor and minority students whose parents cannot opt out of the public school system. But everyone will eventually wind up paying if a large number of Americans, whatever their race or social class, are not introduced to the life of the mind. By devaluing the academic aspects of schooling, educational reformers open the door to all forms of anti-intellectualism, including those identified with the right. All students will be harmed by those who insist that creationism is just as valid as Darwinism or that logic and abstraction are just Western ways of thinking. "A society that tolerates anti-intellectualism in its schools," Ravitch rightly observes, "can expect to have a dumbed-down culture that honors celebrity and sensation rather than knowledge and wisdom." Hollywood and the National Education Association seem quite well-suited for each other.

IF A SCANDAL comparable to the dumbing-down of American education had involved the extortion of billions of dollars in public finds, its perpetrators would find themselves in jail. But this scandal involves only minds; and for reasons that we have not fully grasped, Americans, for all their occasional expressions of anger at the schools, have not called on those responsible for this great waste to account. Perhaps the explanation lies buried in Ravitch's book, where we learn that schools that insist on meeting the desires of their students, encourage a false sense of democratic participation, and reward immediate sensation and instinct, produce a population content with anything that it receives, even with something as thoroughly failed as the American public school system.

It follows that schools that make demands on students, and hold them responsible for their actions, and push them, often against their will, in ways that run counter to their inclinations, will form individuals capable of rebelling against illegitimate authority. We value democracy in our politics, and for this reason we think that we ought to value it in our schools. But just the opposite is the case: political freedom and educational discipline go hand in hand, as do educational freedom and political apathy. It is a great and urgent paradox; and to appreciate it our schools need to teach a greater respect for the complexities of the world than they now do. ■

THE NEW REPUBLIC

WE WOULD LIKE YOUR HELP!

If there is a newsstand or bookstore in your neighborhood that does not sell **THE NEW REPUBLIC**, and you think it should, please let us know.

Either call us at **202.331.7494** (ext. 3402) or send an e-mail message with the name and address of the newsstand or bookstore, along with your name, to: Circulation@tnr.com

For customer service problems or inquiries, please call our toll-free number: **1.800.827.1289**

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LONDON DIARIST

Detached

PEOPLE OFTEN GO TO FLORIDA to escape England—rarely the other way around. But last week I found myself in London looking for a vacation from the American punditry's inane commentary on the recount. I looked forward to a dose of British sobriety and common sense. I found neither. The English reactionary press, incredibly, is even more predictable than our own. In Conrad Black's *Telegraph*, for instance, I came across an ugly little article by one Mark Steyn. Steyn, who moonlights for portentously high-minded journals like *The New Criterion*, wrote about "Chicago Al"—linking the vice president to both the long-dead boss Mayor Richard Daley and the longer-dead gangster Al Capone. Ah, that subtle English grasp of historical nuance.

I ALSO CAME ACROSS ONE OF TNR'S best-known British imports—my old friend and Election 2000 nemesis Andrew Sullivan. In his TRB the week before last, Andrew counseled his American readers to "relax and enjoy. As I write, I still don't know who will be president-elect. But you know what? It doesn't matter that much. The differences [between the candidates] are now so small that it will matter little who walks away with the Oval Office...." How magnificently cool and detached! So imagine my surprise to open the *Times* of London and read the following fevered (not to mention absurd) analysis of the man Andrew claims not to mind a bit: "This endgame is enough to make any fair-minded person realize that Gore is a danger to the country and to the Constitution. He's beginning to make Richard Nixon look magnanimous and Bill Clinton look honest." I thought he wanted us to relax and enjoy!

I SUPPOSE I SHOULDN'T HAVE BEEN surprised. His declaration of calm notwithstanding, Andrew has been panicking in these pages about the prospect of a Gore presidency for several months now. In the same TRB, for example, he conjured up the specter of a Gore government "of, by, and for the old left," with Angela Davis ensconced in an office in the West Wing. Al Gore the political equivalent of Angela Davis and the ethical equivalent of Richard Nixon? To Andrew's insistence that everyone relax I can respond only: Columnist, calm thyself.

I KNOW WE'RE NOT SUPPOSED TO PSYchoanalyze the candidates, but my wife persuaded me early in the campaign that George W. Bush was projecting his own failings onto Gore. When W. accused the vice president of being a habitual liar, for example, he must have realized that he was the one routinely prevaricating: about his accomplishments in education, about his support for patients' rights, about his skill at bipartisanship, about "fuzzy math." Or take the allegation of Bush and his advisers that because Democrats encouraged election supervisors to disqualify unpostmarked absentee ballots in Florida, Gore doesn't respect the military. This from a man who went AWOL from the Alabama Air National Guard for half a year. No one in the unit remembers him, which makes sense, since he doesn't remember them. He also can't remember anything he did while defending Alabama from hostile invasion. And yet his minions say Gore—who volunteered for Vietnam—is too hostile to the military to be commander-in-chief.

IN A CLASSIC BOOK OF MODERN PSYchology, *Adaptation to Life*, George Vaillant defines projection as "attributing one's own unacknowledged feelings to others." In the hierarchy of defenses, projection is considered an "immature mechanism," especially helpful to children between the ages of three and 15 or to grown people with serious character disorders. In Bush's case, either category strikes me as plausible.

TAKE THE BUSHIES' CHARGE THAT THE Democrats are trying to steal the election. What's their evidence? That more voters wanted Bush than Gore? No, they rarely say that—because it's patently untrue. They don't even quite claim, if you listen to them carefully, that more voters cast their ballots for Bush. No, Gore is stealing the election because he is prolonging it. The GOP has made a fetish of the finality of the votes as first tabulated and reported, averting their eyes from the myriad irregularities that distorted the early results. They seem utterly unconcerned that any small business would have more reliable accounting procedures than those validated by Florida's secretary of state—an office given gravity only by its name (you'd think Katherine Harris had the same job as Madeleine Albright). More extraordinary still, the Bushies blithely ignore the palpable evidence that the votes of tens of thousands of Floridians are not just being counted improperly; they are not being counted at all. Gore's people are trying to resurrect these conscientious citizens' ballots. And this is what the Bush crowd calls trying to steal an election.

THE REAL THEFT, OF COURSE, COMES from those doing the accusing. Last weekend, Harris simply refused to include Palm Beach County's additional 215 handcounted Gore votes completed by her arbitrary deadline, because there were still others not counted by that deadline (which, to be sure, she also wouldn't allow, because it ran afoul of her deadline). She disallowed 157 Gore votes hand-counted in Miami-Dade before the county stopped its recount under GOP mob pressure. Harris validated Nassau County's first machine tally, which gave Bush 51 more votes than the mandated second count—the one that was supposed to be, by her own say-so, the benchmark. These votes bring Bush's margin down to around 200. If the 10,750 Miami-Dade ballots on which the oh-so-perfect automatic machines registered not a single presidential choice were counted by hand, Gore would be the winner. In fact, by the standards of this election, he'd be a big winner. This is what the lawsuits challenging Harris's cooked outcome are all about. They rely, as democracies must to remain honest, on the judicial system.

AS A RESULT, THE BUSHIES NOW scream that the Gore campaign wants to decide the election in the courts—forgetting, of course, that they began this lawyering saga. Rather naïvely, the Gore team believed the counties would be allowed to remedy their mistakes without legal intervention. But James Baker and his well-dressed goons would have none of this. The Bushies sued and lost in Florida's Supreme Court. But Harris was available to do their dirty work. Of course, the lady found nothing wrong with the thousands of legally flawed absentee ballot applications purposefully altered in Republican-leaning Seminole County (and, *The New York Times* now reports, in GOP-leaning Martin County as well). The local elections supervisor, who had at first rejected these applications, allowed two local Republican Party operatives to use her office to correct them. This is a clear violation of the Florida law passed in 1998 to avoid such tampering. I wish some of the conservatives insisting so vehemently that the letter—rather than the deeper meaning—of the law should govern the recount in South Florida might address themselves to this gross violation of Florida statute. A certain columnist for THE NEW REPUBLIC, for instance, comes to mind.

MARTIN PERETZ

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Breakthrough in the School Choice Debate



By Kaleem Caire, Executive Director
Black Alliance for Educational Options (BAEO)

Recent months have produced an important breakthrough in the school choice debate.

There now is growing recognition that parental school choice in America is widespread — unless you're poor. Federal test data confirm that children with few education choices generally have the lowest levels of academic achievement. A majority of these children, mostly of color, attend urban school systems.

Increased awareness of these facts has changed the terms of the school choice debate. The result is more discussion of how to give low-income parents access to more educational options.

A *USA Today* editorial on November 16 supported "the gut-level logic powering" the school choice movement: "Namely, the compelling argument raised by parents whose children are trapped in failing schools: Why should they be forced to sacrifice their kids' educational future to schools that the government itself repeatedly has failed to fix?"

On November 10, *The Christian Science Monitor* editorialized that the school choice movement "is not likely to go away until all Americans realize they have a shared interest in improving public education. And the focus of that public interest should be in bringing more choice to schools, starting with those in urban areas."

Albert R. Hunt, a columnist for *The Wall Street Journal*, explained his support for school choice in a November 2 column. He reasoned that "with persistently failing schools...some radical remedies have to be tried or we relegate these kids to a vicious circle from which few escape."

A *Washington Post* editorial, on November 1, supported more school choice experiments, saying, "[I]t's safe to assume that no proposed [school choice] experiment will prove flawless. But we do know the status quo. To the many children losing out in the current system, some state-by-state experimentation might offer relief."

In September, *The New Republic* published an editorial titled, "Easy Choice - Why Gore's wrong and Lieberman's right on vouchers." It endorsed school choice programs targeted at students from low-income families in "communities with the worst schools. The hope is that experiments with vouchers, far from dismantling bad public schools, would help resurrect them." The editorial cited some evidence to that effect from existing choice programs in Milwaukee and Florida.

Parental school choice is widespread - unless you're poor.

In the end, these views cited above reflect a hard reality, explained this way by *The Washingon Post*: "[I]nner-city school reform has been going on for just about as long as inner-city school failure. Most voucher opponents wouldn't, and don't, tolerate such conditions for their children; they won't wait a generation to see whether reform succeeds. They choose private schools or settle in better school districts—where public schools often are doing a pretty good job. Then they argue that enterprising students left behind shouldn't be allowed similarly to escape because it would be unfair to the rest. Not surprisingly, many poor parents don't take kindly to such logic."

The stakes could not be higher. The College Board's National Task Force on Minority High Achievement states, "Until many more underrepresented minority students...are very successful educationally, it will be virtually impossible to integrate our society's institutions completely, especially at leadership levels."

The complete text of all commentaries cited here can be found at www.schoolchoiceinfo.org.

baeo
Black Alliance for Educational Options

for more information go to: www.schoolchoiceinfo.org

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

19,500 ACRES IS A LOT OF OPEN SPACE.

ESPECIALLY WHEN YOUR STRIDE IS ONLY TWO INCHES LONG.

The Greater Prairie Chicken is one of several species to benefit from the latest conservation effort by Phillips Petroleum. Together with the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, Phillips will help restore and manage 19,500 acres in northwestern Missouri, making it a safe haven for high-priority birds. Now breeding populations of Greater Prairie Chickens, Henslow's Sparrows and Bobolinks will have an improved chance of survival. And the finished project will become the first of many bird conservation areas to eventually span the country. It's just one more way Phillips works to improve our world and why we're known as The Performance Company.

PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY

For a copy of our annual report, call 918-661-3700, write to: Phillips Annual Report, B-41, Adams Bldg., Bartlesville, OK 74004, or visit us at www.phillips66.com.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED